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FOUNDING WORKER COOPERATIVES:
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
AND THE LAW
Ariana R. Levinson*
INTRODUCTION
Unions, business lawyers, and economic developers are taking a renewed
look at worker owned cooperatives (worker cooperatives) in light of the eco-
nomic downturn.1 The United Steelworkers, one of the largest industrial unions
in the United States,2 is involved in establishing a worker cooperative in Pitts-
burgh.3 In Cleveland, part of the Cleveland Foundation’s economic develop-
ment project includes the Evergreen Cooperatives.4 In Colorado, business
attorneys are helping small businesses continue after the owners’ retirement by
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commentary on a draft, and the Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations for
supporting this work by awarding the author the 2012–13 Corey Rosen Research
Fellowship. All views are solely those of the author, as are all errors.
1 See, e.g., Linda D. Phillips, Worker Cooperatives: Their Time Has Arrived, COLO. LAW.,
Sept. 2011, at 33; Framework Agreement Between the United Steelworkers (USW) and
Mondragon Internacional, S.A. (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://assets.usw.org/Releases
/agree_usw_mondragon.pdf. There is also a recent renewed interest in cooperatives more
generally. The United Nations declared 2012 the Year of the Cooperative, International Year
of Cooperatives 2012, UNITED NATIONS, http://social.un.org/coopsyear/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2014), the US Senate passed a resolution supporting cooperatives, S. Res. 87, 112th Cong.
(2011), and leaders in cooperative policy visited the White House to meet with top policy-
makers, NCBA Brings 150 Cooperative Leaders to White House to Discuss Jobs and the
Economy, MARKET WIRED (May 3, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://www.marketwired.com/press
-release/NCBA-Brings-150-Cooperative-Leaders-to-White-House-to-Discuss-Jobs-and-the
-Economy-1652569.htm.
2 Who We Are, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/union/mission/who-we-are
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
3 Can Unions and Cooperatives Join Forces? An Interview With United Steelworkers Presi-
dent Leo Gerard, TRUTHOUT (May 24, 2013), http://truth-out.org/news/item/16418-can
-unions-and-cooperatives-join-forces-an-interview-with-united-steelworkers-president-leo
-gerard.
4 See The Evergreen Cooperatives Story, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES, http://evergreen
cooperatives.com/about/evergreen-story/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). See also Jacquelyn
Yates, Can “Anchor Institutions” Help Revitalize Declining Neighborhoods by Buying from
Local Cooperatives?: The Evergreen Cooperative Initiative 1 (unpublished draft), available
at http://www.kent.edu/CAS/oeoc/upload/Revitalize-Neighborhoods.pdf. See generally Jac-
quelyn Yates, The Evergreen Cooperative Laundry Begins Construction: Just the First Step
. . . , OWNERS AT WORK, Summer 2009, at 16; Jacquelyn Yates, Evergreen Coops Are
Taking Root and Growing, OWNERS AT WORK, Winter 2011, at 19.
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transitioning to worker cooperatives.5 At a time when unionization in the pri-
vate sector is below 7 percent,6 wealth and income inequality continue to rise,7
and a sluggish economy may prevent the sale of small businesses,8 the worker
cooperative offers the possibilities of greater job security, higher productivity,
increased employee satisfaction, and a voice for employees in business
decisions.9
Yet despite the promise they hold, worker cooperatives are relatively rare
in the United States. Scholars have sought to explain the absence of large num-
bers of worker cooperatives in the United States as a collective action prob-
lem10 and as the result of government policies and lack of financing.11
Meanwhile, other legal scholars have used the body of social movement theory
5 Linda D. Phillips, LINKED IN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/linda-d-phillips/43/b45/760
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
6 Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Dep’t of Labor, Union Members
Summary (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
7 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call
for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 794, 796 (2011).
8 Phillips, supra note 1, at 36. R
9 The purpose of this article is not to provide a normative defense of worker cooperatives.
For one normative defense, see GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CON-
TROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 23–44 (2003) [hereinafter DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM] .
Those interested in the literature suggesting that worker cooperatives result in increased
employee satisfaction, increased job security, and higher productivity should see Gregory K.
Dow, Worker Participation and Adverse Selection, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, TRADE,
AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF B. CURTIS EATON 203, 217 (Gregory K.
Dow et al. eds., 2010) (mentioning plywood co-ops compared favorably to conventional
firms on standard productivity measures); CHRISTOPHER EATON GUNN, WORKERS’ SELF-
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1984) (noting that forest workers’ co-ops record
of survival compares very favorably with that of traditional small businesses); Frank Linden-
feld, Workers’ Cooperatives: Remedy for Plant Closings?, in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 337, 338–39 (Frank Lindenfeld & Joyce Rothschild-Whitt eds., 1982)
(explaining reasons co-ops should result in greater job satisfaction and productivity); JOHN
PENCAVEL, WORKER PARTICIPATION: LESSONS FROM WORKER CO-OPS OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST 51 (2002) (finding Plywood co-ops produce more output from “any given set of
inputs” than traditional plywood firms); Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a
Job Creation Strategy for Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181,
187 (1999) (discussing how worker co-op can increase job security); Henry Hansmann,
When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1770 (1990) (summarizing ways in which worker owner-
ship promises efficiency advantages); Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining
with Employee Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (1988) (summariz-
ing research indicating employee-controlled firms have increased productivity); Andrew
Pendleton & Andrew Robinson, Employee Stock Ownership, Involvement, and Productivity:
An Interaction-Based Approach, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 23 (2010) (finding wide-
spread opt-in stock ownership increases productivity); Sara Tonnesen, Stronger Together:
Worker Cooperatives as a Community Economic Development Strategy, 20 GEO. J. ON POV-
ERTY L. & POL’Y 187, 195–96 (2012) (discussing how worker cooperative can reduce
unemployment).
10 Justin Schwartz, Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather
than the Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market
Economies, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 219, 267 (2012).
11 Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, Broad-based Worker Ownership and Profit Sharing:
Can These Ideas Work in the Entire Economy? 3–4 (Mar. 6, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/ASA/Blasi%20and%20Kruse%20Real
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to explain how groups can overcome barriers to organization in other contexts,
such as to build a successful immigrant labor campaign,12 assert privacy rights
in the face of electronic surveillance,13 advocate for constitutional reform,14
overcome discriminatory hiring practices,15 advocate for protection of the local
environment,16 secure protections for animals,17 and start an internet campaign
for human rights.18 Indeed, social movement theorists have worked for many
decades to develop explanations of the circumstances under which social move-
ments arise.19
This is the first interdisciplinary law and sociology article, to the author’s
knowledge, to apply social movement theory to the foundation of worker coop-
eratives in the United States.20 It also begins a series of articles with three
goals. First, the application of social movement theory to worker cooperatives
should suggest further areas of inquiry in developing arguments in social move-
ment theory. Second, unions and others can derive guidance from social move-
ment theory as they seek to give workers a voice by establishing worker
%20Utopias%20proposal%20—%20worker%20ownership.pdf. See also PENCAVEL, supra
note 9, at 16. R
12 Maria L. Ontiveros, Building a Movement with Immigrant Workers: The 1972–74 Strike
and Boycott at Farah Manufacturing, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 479, 501 (2011).
13 See generally Laura Huey, A Social Movement for Privacy/Against Surveillance? Some
Difficulties in Engendering Mass Resistance in a Land of Twitter and Tweets, 42 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 699 (2010).
14 Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An
Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations,
14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209, 229–31 (2011).
15 Philip Lee, The Griswold 9 and Student Activism for Faculty Diversity at Harvard Law
School in the Early 1990s, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 49, 84–85 (2011).
16 Sherry A. Enzler, How Law Mattered to the Mono Lake Ecosystem, 35 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 413, 450–51 (2011).
17 Jerry L. Anderson, Protection for the Powerless: Political Economy History Lessons for
the Animal Welfare Movement, 4 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2011).
18 Molly Beutz Land, Networked Activism, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 205 (2009).
19 The social movement theorists do not claim to have an overall predictive paradigm.
Rather they seek to explain social movements and to identify causal predictors of successful
movements. Charles Tilly, Wise Quacks, in RETHINKING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: STRUCTURE,
MEANING, AND EMOTION 31, 34 (Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper eds., 2004).
20 This article applies three theories to five historical examples of worker cooperatives and
focuses on the founding of the cooperatives. Later works may focus on current examples of
worker cooperatives, including those resulting from the Steelworkers/Mondragon project and
the Cleveland project, and may apply different sociological theories to explore the success or
failure of cooperatives after founding. Cf. Howard Aldrich & Robert N. Stern, Resource
Mobilization and the Creation of US Producer’s Cooperatives, 1835–1935, 4 ECON. &
INDUS. DEMOCRACY 371, 400 (1983) (focusing on how lack of resource mobilization
explains why so few worker cooperatives were founded); PATRICK DEVELTERE, CTR. FOR
THE STUDY OF CO-OPS., OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES #92-03, CO-OPERATIVES & DEVELOP-
MENT: TOWARDS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE iii (1992), available at http://www.us
askstudies.coop/pdf-files/publications/1992/Co-ops%20%26%20Development.pdf (describ-
ing how formation of cooperatives in developing countries is essentially a social movement
phenomenon); Marc Schneiberg et al., Social Movements and Organizational Form: Coop-
erative Alternatives to Corporations in the American Insurance, Dairy, and Grain Indus-
tries, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 635 (2008) (analyzing how cooperative enterprise was affected by
the Grange).
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cooperatives. Finally, social movement theory may suggest how the law can be
reformed to aid in creating movements to establish cooperatives.
This first article applies the work of three groups of thinkers within social
movement theory to each of five historical examples of worker cooperatives in
the United States.21 It focuses on the establishment of the cooperatives rather
than their success or failure over time.22 The article hereafter proceeds in five
additional parts. Part I describes worker cooperatives generally and provides
five historical examples of worker cooperatives.23 Part II describes social
movement theory and three arguments within the body of theory, applies the
arguments to several of the movements to found worker cooperatives, and
draws conclusions and suggests further areas of inquiry. Part III provides
insights for those wishing to establish cooperatives, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the cooptation of structures intended for other purposes, education of
leaders, internal organizing, availability of resources, and government support.
Part IV briefly mentions potential legal reforms,24 and Part V concludes.
I. WORKER COOPERATIVES
Worker cooperatives are firms that workers own and democratically man-
age.25 The pure worker cooperative involves a legal structure in which each
employee has one equal share in the entity and one vote.26 Workers determine
what is produced, how profits are allocated, who manages the firm, and
21 Future comparative work would likely be fruitful. The author may explore a comparison
to British worker cooperatives, such as Triumph-Meriden Motorcycle Works, which was
founded in 1975 and declared bankruptcy in 1983, Equity Shoes Ltd., which was founded in
1886 and closed as a cooperative in December 2008, the currently-operating John Lewis
Partnership, which runs department stores and supermarkets, and Suma, the largest indepen-
dent wholefood wholesaler distributor in England. For information on Triumph-Meriden
Motorcycle Works, and Equity Shoes Ltd., see J. David Edelstein, The Origin, Structure,
and Problems of Four British Producers’ Cooperatives, in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 9, at 199, 208–15. For information on the John Lewis Partner-
ship, see Bill McIntyre, Employee-Owned Cooperatives in U.K. Are Rich in History and
Promise for the Future, OWNERS AT WORK, Summer 2011, at 6, 7. For information on
Suma, see About Suma, SUMA SPECIALIST WHOLESALERS, http://www.suma.coop/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 16, 2014).
22 Each of the worker cooperatives studied eventually went out of business. While the ques-
tion of why worker cooperatives fail is another interesting research topic, research indicates
that worker cooperatives do not fail at any higher rates than other businesses. Erik K. Olsen,
The Relative Survival of Worker Cooperatives and Barriers to Their Creation, in 14
ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY & LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS 83,
83–84 (Douglas Kruse ed., 2013). Instead the primary barriers to their existence appear to be
barriers to formation. Id.
23 These five examples were selected because case studies providing information about their
formation was available. Detailed information about the formation of worker co-ops is rela-
tively rare, and, although varied, the examples are not intended to be a statistically represen-
tative sample.
24 The analysis of the legal reforms will be the subject of a follow-on article.
25 Lindenfeld, supra note 9, at 338. R
26 See Aldrich & Stern, supra note 20, at 373; Lindenfeld, supra note 9, at 338. Multi- R
stakeholder worker cooperatives may involve outside investors or shared ownership with
community groups and are receiving renewed attention by economic development groups.
See MARGARET LUND, COOP. DEV. CTR. AT KENT STATE UNIV., SOLIDARITY AS A BUSINESS
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whether or not to make investments.27 Ideally, worker cooperatives provide job
security, ensure good working conditions and pay, and improve quality of life
in the community.28
While worker cooperatives are not commonplace in the United States, his-
torically many successfully operated worker cooperatives have survived eco-
nomically and provided workers control over the business.29 The first
movement toward worker cooperatives started in 1790 because of changes in
work processes.30 Then, in the early 1900s, another wave of cooperatives
formed in response to the massive unemployment of the Depression.31 Between
1790 and 1959, there were more than 700 documented cases of worker cooper-
atives in industries ranging from shoe manufacturing to sheet metal work to
coal mining.32 Then, during the 1960s and 1970s, which is known to have been
a time of social unrest, another group of worker cooperatives was founded.33
This section describes five historical examples of worker cooperatives,
each of which survived for different lengths of time with varying degrees of
success at fostering worker participation and at remaining productive. The next
section will apply social movement theory to their foundation to provide gui-
dance for those seeking to establish worker cooperatives today. First, the sec-
tion describes the Plywood cooperatives, which were founded between the
1920s and the 1950s, and provide an example of a highly productive group of
cooperatives. Second, the section describes Hoedads, which was founded in
1971 and was a highly participatory worker cooperative. Third, the section
describes Denver Yellow Cab, founded in 1978 as the result of a union-initiated
buyout of a productive company. Fourth, the section describes Rath Packing, a
short-lived cooperative founded in 1978 as a result of a community and union-
initiated buyout of a failing company. Finally, the section describes Interna-
tional Poultry, a very short-lived cooperative founded in 1979 as a result of a
community development initiative.
A. Plywood Cooperatives
The Plywood cooperatives have probably received the most attention of
any cooperative or group of cooperatives in the legal literature.34 While a purist
MODEL: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COOPERATIVES MANUAL 8–10, available at http://www
.uwcc.wisc.edu/pdf/multistakeholder%20coop%20manual.pdf.
27 Lindenfeld, supra note 9, at 338. R
28 Id.
29 Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin, Work in America and the Cooperative Movement, in
WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 3, 3 (Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin eds., 1984). Cf.
Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? Cooperative,
Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (2011)
(noting success of cooperatives and advocating their use for economic development).
30 Jackall & Levin, supra note 29, at 35. R
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Conse-
quences of Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 305, 307 n.9 (2008);
Gia L. Cincone, Note, Land Reform and Corporate Redistribution: The Republican Legacy,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1229, 1253 n.186 (1987); Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American
Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 694; David Eller-
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might not consider them true worker cooperatives because many of them hired
non-member employees, making up as much as 47 percent of the workforce,35
they are included here because they are so often cited as preeminent examples
of productive worker cooperatives.
The first Plywood cooperative, Olympia Veneer, was founded in 1921 by
125 members.36 The two organizers, Edward Westman and J.J. Lucas, sold
shares for $500 to “experienced loggers, carpenters, and mechanics . . . to
finance construction.”37 The members built the plant themselves.38 In July
1921, each member contributed an additional $500, either up front or as a debt
owed from future wages.39 They also secured a bank loan for $25,000.40 Oper-
ations began in August 1921.41 Within a short time, they were earning one and
a half times what workers in traditional plants were earning.42
New co-ops formed through the 1950s.43 Several factors probably contrib-
uted to the foundation of the cooperatives. First was the need to create employ-
ment in the region.44 Some resulted from buyouts of closing plants.45 Second,
many of those in the area were of Scandinavian descent, so they may have been
“culturally more inclined to seek cooperative solutions . . . .”46 Third, the
growth period of the major new industry of plywood production created a mar-
ket opening.47 Finally, brokers promoted the sale of co-op stock shares.48 The
man & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Cooperative Statute
in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 445 (1983); Cynthia L. Estlund,
Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment,
75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 725–26 n.164 (1997); G. Mitu Gulati et al., When a Workers’ Cooper-
ative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1421 n.5 (2002);
Hansmann, supra note 9, at 1757–58; Peter Pitegoff, Worker Ownership in Enron’s Wake—
Revisiting a Community Development Tactic, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 239, 249
(2004); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 237–38; William H. Simon, Social-Republican Prop- R
erty, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1369, 1395 (1991); Lewis D. Solomon & Melissa B. Kirgis,
Business Cooperatives: A Primer, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 233, 263–64 (1994); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging
Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 127 (1988).
35 Solomon & Kirgis, supra note 34, at 263. See also GUNN, supra note 9, at 118. In 1984, R
at only one of the eleven cooperatives were these non-member employees unionized. Id. at
116. The cooperatives would lay off these employees during difficult economic times. Id.
36 GUNN, supra note 9, at 100. R
37 DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM, supra note 9, at 50. R
38 GUNN, supra note 9, at 100. R
39 DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM, supra note 9, at 50–51. R
40 Id. at 51.
41 Id.
42 GUNN, supra note 9, at 100. R
43 Id.
44 Id. at 104.
45 Edward S. Greenberg, Producer Cooperatives and Democratic Theory: The Case of the
Plywood Firms, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 171, 175.
46 GUNN, supra note 9, at 104. See RICHARD C. WILLIAMS, THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT: R
GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 21 (2007) (“Doubtless the Scandinavian heritage of much of
the population of Washington made it a fertile ground for new cooperative enterprises.”).
47 GUNN, supra note 9, at 104. R
48 Id. Eventually many of these promoters were criminally prosecuted for speculation and
fraud, which may have caused others to become suspicious of using the cooperative form.
Id.
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creation of the co-ops was financed by various means in addition to member-
ship fees.49 These included: mortgaging property, borrowing from banks, bor-
rowing from friends and family, borrowing from the Small Business
Administration, and using installment payments to purchase equipment.50
In the 1960s and 1970s, the cooperatives made up 10 percent of the indus-
try.51 In 1984, there were eleven cooperatives, all located in Washington and
Oregon.52 One was incorporated as a cooperative corporation, as opposed to a
conventional corporation with co-op bylaws and tax treatment.53 All of the
cooperatives appear to have gone out of business by 2010.54
The Plywood cooperatives’ owner-members worked in the cooperatives.55
They had equal votes in decision making and received equal pay based on the
number of hours worked.56 They elected the board of directors, and the board
appointed a manager.57 Plant committees determined who did what job, assur-
ing equality of assignments and job rotation.58 There is debate in the literature
as to how similar to a conventional firm the work process job structure was.
While there were managers, job responsibilities may have been less defined and
collaboration more welcomed.59 In difficult times, the entire membership
would take an income cut.60
Most members were white males, and, in 1984, the average age was
43.5.61 The main reasons members joined in 1984 were to make financial
investments and gain potential for good income and job security.62 Between the
1920s and the 1980s, others may have joined for slightly different reasons. One
manager noted that “there has been a change in the attitudes of owner-members
. . . with young owner-members today desiring more present income for con-
sumption (homes, pickup trucks, boats) than younger owner-members did
twenty years ago.”63
49 DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM, supra note 9, at 52. R
50 Id.
51 GUNN, supra note 9, at 100–01. R
52 Id. at 101.
53 Id.
54 DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM, supra note 9, at 50, 53, 56 (mentioning that the co-ops
gradually disappeared as the plywood industry declined and that only three co-ops remained
in 2001); PENCAVEL, supra note 9, at 20 (stating only three co-ops in operation as of date of R
book); 3.4 Worker-Owned Cooperatives, ADBINSTITUTE, http://www.adbi.org/research%20
paper/2003/04/01/38.employees.in.asian.enterprises/3.4...workerowned.cooperatives/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2014) (describing reasons that plywood co-ops ultimately failed).
55 GUNN, supra note 9, at 99. R
56 Id.
57 Id. at 100.
58 Id. at 109.
59 Cf. id. at 110 (noting a traditional hierarchical job structure); PENCAVEL, supra note 9, at R
34 (noting more collaborative structure than a traditional firm); Greenberg, supra note 45, at R
190 (describing how process of work is identical to traditional firm but there are significant
differences in job rotation and supervision).
60 GUNN, supra note 9, at 103. R
61 Id. at 105.
62 Id. See also Greenberg, supra note 45. R
63 GUNN, supra note 9, at 117. R
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The cooperatives belonged to the American Plywood Association.64 In
1984, four of the eleven also belonged to the Plywood Marketing Association, a
cooperative organization that owned railroad cars.65 The cooperatives lent
funds to each other and occasionally shared management.66 They also formed
“a Worker-Owned Plywood Association to study their tax situation and lobby
on their behalf.”67 Some of the early legal precedents enabling income from
owner-members’ work to be treated as patronage and exempted from double-
taxation were established by cases involving the plywood co-ops.68 They had
few other links to each other.69
B. Hoedads
While mentioned far less often than the Plywood cooperatives in the legal
literature,70 Hoedads was a long-standing and successful reforestation coopera-
tive based in Eugene, Oregon.71 Hoedads played “an active role in developing
legal status for co-ops . . . through working for judicial and legislative defini-
tion of the special characteristics that set this legal entity apart from more tradi-
tional businesses.”72 The co-op was committed to egalitarianism and
democracy in internal decision-making and devoted energy and resources to
progressive social, environmental, and political causes.73 Members held vari-
ous views such as “leftist, countercultural, and anarchist,” as well as feminist,
and crews retained a good deal of autonomy.74 Hoedads was part of a larger
community of “alternative firms and community-based organizations,” with
around 250 of them existing in 1984.75 The members were typically between
the ages of twenty and thirty, single, and college educated.76 Forty percent
were women, and minority groups were more highly represented than in the
Eugene community population.77
64 Id. at 105.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 106.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 A literature review discloses only one citation in a law review. Book Note, A “Four
Warning,” 107 HARV. L. REV. 2105, 2110 (1994) (reviewing A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZA-
TION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES) (Gregory S. Alexan-
der & Graznya Skapska eds., 1994).
71 Christopher Gunn, Hoedads Co-op: Democracy and Cooperation at Work, in WORKER
COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 141, 141.
72 Id. at 142.
73 Id. at 141.
74 GUNN, supra note 9, at 76. R
75 Gunn, supra note 71, at 142–43.
76 Id. at 142.
77 Id.
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In 1969, two of the three founding members78 of Hoedads performed a
tree-planting job for a large timber company, Weyerhaeuser.79 One of them
stated that while working for Weyerhaeuser, he had realized that the work pro-
vided control over his “destiny.” The founders also realized that they should
bid on jobs rather than work as employees to have more control.80 The two
recruited another college friend, after which they bid and entered into their first
contract.81 In the spring of 1971 they recruited two additional partners and
named the partnership Hoedads.82 They continued to recruit partners, including
another mutual college friend who had been raised in a union family and was
familiar with organizing.83 Some heard rumors about Hoedads and were inter-
ested in joining,84 and, over time, rumors of work spread quickly among the
unemployed.85 The first contracts did not require bonds.86 After that, contracts
were bonded using collectively held land, old vehicles, and personal belong-
ings.87 Hoedads was financed through the payment of membership fees.88
Founding members had to use income from other sources while working on and
waiting for payment for the work on the first few contracts.89 They worked
part-time at other jobs to acquire the funds to purchase tools and lived in cars
and tents.90
During the first two years, the firm continued to expand and took on a
loose cooperative form,91 but did not incorporate as a co-op.92 The early mem-
bers learned from “trial by error” and their ethical practices resulted in trees
having a 90 percent survival rate, rather than the typical 10 percent survival
rate.93 The counterculture of the late 1960s helped shape the organization.94
The members became good at “participatory self-management.”95 The co-op
78 Two of the founding members were Jerry Rust and John Sunquist, who had worked as a
crew together before founding Hoedads. Lois Wadsworth, Tree Planters: The Mighty
Hoedads, Back for a 30-year Reunion, Recall Their Grand Experiment, EUGENE WEEKLY
(Aug. 2, 2001), http://www2.eugeneweekly.com/2001/08_02_01/coverstory.html. The other
founding member was John Corbin. Jeff Wright, Back to the Woods: 30 years Later, Hippie
Hoedads Celebrate the Birth of Their Tree-planting Cooperative, REGISTER-GUARD, http://
dechene.com/hoedads/Back.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2001).
79 Wadsworth, supra note 78.
80 Id.
81 HAL HARTZELL, JR., BIRTH OF A COOPERATIVE: HOEDAD’S, INC. 42 (1987).
82 Id. at 45.
83 Id. at 47.
84 Id. at 53.
85 Id. at 62.
86 Id. at 55.
87
 Gunn, supra note 71, at 159. Two members owned land that was used as bonding collat- R
eral. Wright, supra note 78. R
88 Gunn, supra note 71, at 158. The fee was usually paid out of earnings because members R
did not necessarily have $2,000 to pay up front. Id.
89 Id. at 159.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 143. At some point the group of co-ops in the area was sued by the private contrac-
tors’ trade association for failing to pay workers compensation and responded by asserting
the workers are independent contractors. See id. at 142.
92 HARTZELL, supra note 81, at 85.
93 Wadsworth, supra note 78. R
94 Gunn, supra note 71, at 143. R
95 Wadsworth, supra note 78. R
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“fought the early battles for viability, put up communally held land for bonding
power, and trained many of the new members to be tree planters.”96
In the summer of 1973, Hoedads placed an ad in an alternative paper and
immediately received more than 100 responses.97 In February of 1974,
Hoedads was incorporated as a cooperative corporation under Oregon law.98 In
1974, the co-op had approximately 135 members working in seven crews.99
Also in 1974, one of the crews found it would be unable to complete a contract
within the specified period, a circumstance that could jeopardize the co-op.100
Seventy-five other members showed up with tools and food, and the contract
was successfully completed.101 “The teamwork involved and the joyous cele-
bration that followed helped to reinforce members’ understanding of what the
Hoedads Cooperative was all about.”102
During the expansion of membership in 1974, the old leaders no longer
automatically became the officers of the co-op, and new leaders with democ-
racy as an ideology emerged.103 Bylaws established in 1974 called for officers
to coordinate and facilitate rather than direct.104 The board of directors was
called a council, and included one member from each work crew, with each
board member having one vote.105 Council members met weekly during the
busy work season, and less frequently during the summer.106 Because many
decisions were made at the work crew level, the general governance process
was quite participatory.107
In 1976, Hoedads had its first involvement with local politics when its first
president ran for county commissioner.108 As an Independent with the bulk of
his funding provided by the co-op and its members, he defeated the fourteen-
year incumbent.109 The co-op realized through the successful election that “it
could transfer its organizational energy to a broader political arena.”110 The co-
op thereafter participated in lobbying, herbicide and pesticide research, com-
96 Gunn, supra note 71, at 143. R
97 HARTZELL, supra note 81, at 107.
98 Id. at 200. Gunn believes The Cooperative Corporation Act made it simpler for a business
to incorporate as a co-op in Oregon than elsewhere. GUNN, supra note 9, at 70. R
Federal tax treatment of workers’ co-ops as well as their state-determined legal definition
emphasize an “association of individuals” character. Income to a co-op belongs to all its mem-
bers. It is distributed on the basis of patronage—the work a member does with the co-op. Income
that flows through the co-op to the member is taxable only as income to the member. Income that
is not distributed, that is retained in the co-op as surplus, and any nonwork income is taxable for
the co-op. . . . The forest workers’ co-ops deliver seventy-five to ninety percent of the income
flowing through the co-op in any accounting period to their members.
Id. (citation omitted).
99 HARTZELL, supra note 81, at 307.
100 Gunn, supra note 71, at 159. R
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 144.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 145.
106 Id. at 148.
107 See id.
108 Id. at 143.
109 Id. at 144.
110 Id.
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munity-volunteer projects to clear brush rather than use herbicides, and projects
involving other forest workers.111
In 1978, the co-op had 515 members and, due to the difficulty of demo-
cratic management, aimed to reduce its membership to 300.112 Because of the
bad economy, the co-op had around 200 members in 1982.113 By 1984, it had
around 300. Hoedads disbanded in 1994, probably as a result of economics, but
perhaps also because members had moved on and the cooperative had lost its
“family feeling.”114
C. Denver Yellow Cab
Denver Yellow Cab is mentioned sparingly in the legal literature,115 but is
an excellent example of a union-initiated cooperative involving a buyout not of
a failing company but of a profitable one.116 Before it was established as a co-
op in 1979, Denver Yellow Cab was a privately held company.
The events leading to the transformation of the company into a co-op
began in 1969.117 That year, the drivers left the Teamsters because the hierar-
chy was not responsive to the needs of the drivers who were independent con-
tractors.118 In general, “[d]rivers tend to be very independent people from
diverse backgrounds.”119 The drivers formed the Independent Drivers Associa-
tion (IDA), a strong, local, nonaffiliated union.120 In 1973, the drivers looked
into the possibility of buying the company and running it themselves, but they
had no funding.121 In 1976, new owners took over the company, and, as the
relationship between them and the union deteriorated, the leaders proposed a
dollar-per-shift strike fund, which received strong endorsement.122 When the
company refused to continue the dues checkoff,123 the union members paid
their dues directly, with 90 percent of dues being paid.124 Then, in the fall of
1977, the union went on strike because the company had locked out all non-
driving employees.125 “[The] five-week strike demonstrated the strength and
solidarity of the IDA.”126 During the strike, the union members ran an alternate
111 Id.
112 GUNN, supra note 9, at 75. R
113 Id.
114 Wright, supra note 78. R
115 Toni Delmonte, In Defense of Union Involvement in Worker Ownership, 10 IN PUB.
INTEREST 14, 20 (1990); Harper, supra note 9, at 65.
116 GUNN, supra note 9, at 152. R
117 Id. at 153.
118 Id. at 153–54.
119 Id. at 153.
120 Id. at 154.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123
“Dues check-off” is when an employer automatically deducts union dues from
employee’s paychecks.
124 Gunn, supra note 9, at 154. R
125 Id.
126 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 12 24-APR-14 14:44
Spring 2014] FOUNDING WORKER COOPERATIVES 333
courtesy car company.127 The strike ended with a favorable offer for the union
and other bargaining units.128
In 1978, the holding company for Denver Cab bought out the other inves-
tors and was looking for a buyer.129 The union leaders began thinking about
how members could buy the company and run it as a co-op.130 They had a
strike fund of over $100,000 and quickly formulated plans.131 Union members
voted to buy the company, and the attorneys worked out an agreement whereby
workers would take over the company in 1979. The union increased the strike
fund payment to $1.50 per shift.132 The financing for the co-op came from the
strike fund and a bank loan.133
The new bylaws were the result of meetings and discussion and were
approved by a large majority of employees.134 All drivers had to belong to the
co-op, and four of the six unions covering other employees also required co-op
membership.135 Membership lasted as long as a person was employed with the
co-op, and each member had one vote in decision-making.136 The members
elected a board of directors from members who were not union officers or
department heads.137 In 1981, a requirement was added to the bylaws that one
of the nine members of the board of directors must be a non-driver
employee.138 The board appointed the officers and management team.139 The
day-to-day routine of employees and drivers was not changed by the co-op
structure.140 In 1984, the co-op had four hundred cabs and more than nine hun-
dred drivers.141 The co-op appears to have declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
1993, and to have subsequently been bought out by new owners.142
D. Rath Packing Company
Like the Plywood co-ops, Rath Packing Company has been noted in the
legal literature,143 and is an example of a buyout of a failing company. Rath
127 Id.
128 Id. at 155.
129 Id.
130 Id. They included the union’s attorney. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 156.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 157.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 158.
140 Id. at 159.
141 Id. at 153.
142 WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 158 (drivers preferred not to participate in group
processes). See also Yellow Cab Coop. Ass’n v. Metro Taxi, Inc., 132 F.3d 591, 593 (10th
Cir. 1997).
143 See, e.g., Craver, supra note 34, at 691; Delmonte, supra note 115, at 16–18; Ellerman R
& Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 448 n.33; Deborah Groban Olson, Union Experiences with
Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock
Purchases and Co-operatives, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 729, 753–60; Harper, supra note 9, at 39
n.120; Elana Ruth Hollo, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Their
Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future American Policy, 23
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was a meatpacking company in Waterloo, Iowa.144 The Rath employees origi-
nally organized in 1943 in the face of considerable employer opposition, join-
ing the United Packinghouse Workers, and, through union mergers, eventually
became members of the United Food and Commercial Workers.145 During the
1950s and 60s, the management made some crucial mistakes by not marketing
to supermarkets and failing to invest in constructing a single story building.146
In 1978, the Black Hawk County Economic Development Committee was
concerned about Rath’s future147 and received a grant from the US Department
of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration to hire a consultant to
determine how to make the company competitive again.148 The consultant con-
cluded that $4.5 million in improvements were needed to make Rath profita-
ble.149 The US Department of Housing and Urban Development agreed to
provide a grant if new equity capital was also found.150 Only one investor came
forward, and that investor would have required the workers to take cuts in
wages and benefits.151 So the union, United Food and Commercial Workers
Local 46, presented a plan for employees to take wage and benefit cuts and to
purchase the stock themselves.152 The union had been very adversarial to man-
agement and was considered to be strong and combative.153 The concessions,
RUTGERS L.J. 561, 568 n.36 (1992); Alan Hyde & Craig Harnett Livingston, Employee Take-
overs, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1131, 1132 n.3 (1989); Corey Rosen & James Wilson, Employee
Ownership: A New Strategy for Economic Development, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
211, 219 (1986–87); Corey Rosen & Alan Cohen, Employees to the Rescue: The Record of
Worker Buyouts, 6 J.L. & COM. 213, 213–215 (1986).
144 GUNN, supra note 9, at 133–34. In addition to the primary meat packing plant, Rath
Packing also operated a smaller production plant that it leased in Indianapolis and owned a
second slaughter plant in Columbus Junction, Iowa. It was originally started in 1891. Id.
145 Tove H. Hammer & Robert N. Stern, A Yo-Yo Model of Cooperation: Union Participa-
tion in Management at the Rath Packing Company, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 337, 340
(1986).
146 Gene Redmon et al., A Lost Dream: Worker Control at Rath Packing, 1 LAB. RES. REV.
5, 5 (1985).
147 The Committee consisted of representatives from the union, Rath, and local and regional
organizations. Delmonte, supra note 115, at 17. Rath was the second largest employer in R
Black Hawk County. If it were to shut down the unemployment rate due to the layoffs would
have increased by more than 3 percent. The secondary unemployment probably would have
pushed the unemployment rate from 4.9 percent to 15 percent. GUNN, supra note 9, at 135
n.2. One thousand and nine hundred workers would have lost their jobs with a ripple effect
of $171 million loss to the community. Redmon et al., supra note 146.
148 GUNN, supra note 9, at 135. R
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 136. The employees were to defer half of their paid vacation and sick leave days
and take a fifty-cent per hour cut in any wage and fringe benefits increase established by the
master agreement. There was an optional twenty dollar per-week payroll deduction for all
employees, management and labor. Hammer & Stern, supra note 145, at 341. One source
states that only the twenty dollar per-week deduction funded the stock purchase. Redmon et
al., supra note 146, at 9. The concessions were matching funds for the Urban Development
Action Grant. Id. at 10.
153 Hammer & Stern, supra note 145.
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however, caused friction with the international union because they could be
viewed as a bargaining chip by other businesses.154
Employees immediately began to deposit money into an escrow
account.155 If the union’s plan were approved, the union would have the imme-
diate right to name the majority of the board of directors.156 Both the stock-
holders and the employees approved the plan in 1980.157 When the Department
of Labor’s ERISA section disapproved the planned trust calling for one vote
per member, the union hired an attorney to create an employee stock ownership
plan (ESOP) for the workers.158 The board, employees, and stockholders
approved the revised plan.159 The employee stock purchase plan provided for
60 percent of the company stock to go to the employees over a two-year
period.160 The employee stock ownership trust was open to “labor and manage-
ment, and all employee owners held an equal number of shares.”161 Most
employees elected to join.162 Regular participant meetings would be held so
that trustees knew how to vote the employees’ stock at the annual stockholders
meeting.163 The trust could buy back employee stock from those who left
Rath.164 The ESOP board of trustees had a majority of worker members on the
five-person board of trustees.165 The company’s board of directors probably
included three worker representatives and seven outside union named repre-
sentatives.166 A new president was hired, and new committees and teams were
designed for worker participation.167
154 GUNN, supra note 9, at 143 (quoting Vice President of UFCW’s meat-packing division R
as stating, “It is impossible for a union official to serve a dual role in management . . . .”).
One source states that while the international did not favor the partnership in principle, it did
not oppose the developments at Rath. Hammer & Stern, supra note 145, at 344.
155 GUNN, supra note 9, at 136 (depositing equivalent of proposed temporary wage and R
benefit cuts).
156 Id. 
157 Id.
158 Id. at 137. The proposed plan failed because the DOL did not waive an ERISA regula-
tion that limits to 10 percent the amount of company stock a pension fund trust can hold. The
proposed stock fund would hold stock that could be used for retirement income. Id.
159 Id. at 138.
160 Id. at 137. One source states that the ESOP ultimately ended up with 49.5 percent of
stock rather than 60 percent because certain members held the stock individually rather than
through the ESOP. Redmon et al., supra note 146, at 8.
161 Hammer & Stern, supra note 145, at 341.
162 Id. One bargaining unit in a subsidiary plant did not elect to join the stock ownership
trust. Id.
163 Redmon et al., supra note 146, at 7.
164 Id.
165 Hammer & Stern, supra note 145, at 341 (stating three of five trustees were worker
members). See also GUNN, supra note 9, at 139 (stating all five trustees were employees). R
166 Hammer & Stern, supra note 145, at 341. See also GUNN, supra note 9, at 140. One
source states there were six Local 46 members on the Board, out of thirteen board members.
Redmon et al., supra note 146, at 8.
167 GUNN, supra note 9, at 138. See William Foote Whyte et al., Worker Ownership, Partic- R
ipation, and Control: Toward a Theoretical Model, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS:
CLASSIC, CONTEMPORARY, AND CRITICAL READINGS 475, 477, 483 (Michael J. Handel ed.,
2003) (describing work of committees).
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Unfortunately, hierarchy tended to reemerge at Rath.168 The union contin-
ued to play a traditional role in the company, and the workers allowed the
union president and steward to make their management decisions for them.169
The new company president believed that workers should “have more say in
how the company is run, but not actually run it.”170 By 1982, when the com-
pany did not turn around, the union president became manager of manufactur-
ing.171 Then in 1983, the international union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board over a $2.50 per hour wage
cut.172 Shortly thereafter, the former union president became CEO.173 As CEO,
he demanded benefit concessions, declared bankruptcy in 1983, and sought
relief from the collective bargaining agreement.174 The members attempted to
decertify the local union.175 The plant closed in 1985, and the co-op began to
liquidate its assets.176
E. International Poultry
While International Poultry is rarely mentioned in the legal literature,177
and generally little information is available about it, it is a good example in
light of the economic development goals of some of today’s movements to
found worker co-ops. Menorah Kosher Poultry, a chicken processing plant that
was located in Willimantic, Connecticut, closed in 1976, resulting in approxi-
mately seventy-five persons, primarily minority women, losing their jobs.178
The plant was reopened in 1978 under the new name International Poultry as a
result of a worker buyout.179 The Connecticut Federation for Economic
Democracy (“Federation”) pushed for the opening of a new processing com-
pany.180 The Boston-based Industrial Cooperative Association helped secure
the funds necessary to reopen the plant.181 Loans were secured from the Cam-
paign for Human Development of the Catholic Church, the federal Community
Services Administration, individual investors, and the US Small Business
Administration.182 Workers and friends volunteered numerous hours to reno-
vate the building.183 In 1979, the firm reopened with eleven workers.184
168 GUNN, supra note 9, at 142. R
169 Id. at 139, 141.
170 Id. at 142 (internal quotations omitted).
171 Hammer & Stern, supra note 145, at 345.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 345–46.
175 Id. at 346.
176 Id.; Whyte et al., supra note 167, at 484 (large outside food processing company subse-
quently renovated and took over Waterloo plant).
177 A legal literature review disclosed only one time International Poultry was mentioned in
a law review article. Rosen & Cohen, Employees to the Rescue, supra note 143, at 215 n.7.
178 Lindenfeld, supra note 9, at 343. R
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 343–44.
182 Id. at 343.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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Shortly thereafter, however, the plant failed in the face of competition and an
inability to capture a share of the institutional market.185
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
Social movement theory is a body of theory within sociology that seeks to
explain when and why people join a movement, protest, or other form of col-
lective action and the form that action takes.186 When laypeople think of a
social movement, they often envision a large movement of significant impor-
tance, such as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, or the envi-
ronmental movement. Yet, social movement theorists also study many smaller
scale movements, such as strikes, food riots, school truancy, freeway opposi-
tion groups, and anti-toxic waste groups. Thus, the study of movements to
found worker co-ops is a fruitful application of social movement theory.
Different social movement theorists use somewhat different definitions of
the phenomena they are studying, but the theorists generally agree on the defi-
nition of a social movement. Charles Tilly finds in reviewing social movement
literature that the following definition of social movement conveys the usual
meaning of the term:
[A] deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any
means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into “utopian”
community . . . A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organization,
though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization to the
highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the corporate group . . . A
social movement’s commitment to change and the raison d’e´tre of its organization
are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement’s
aims or beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members.187
Thus, social movement theorists seek to explain collective action to promote
change.
Social movement theory in the United States started out with a focus on
social psychology and sought to characterize protest as deviant, irrational, and
unexplainable behavior.188 The field then became heavily influenced by
Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action, and a prominent group of thinkers
developed a resource mobilization theory.189 Resource mobilization theory
185 Id. at 343–44.
186 David A. Snow et al., Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 3, 11 (David A. Snow et al. eds., 2004); see generally Charles Tilly, Social
Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performances, 38 BERKELEY J. OF
SOC. 1 (1994).
187 CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 39–40 (1978) (internal quotation
omitted). The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements defines social movements as “col-
lectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or
organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority,
whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or
world order of which they are a part.” Snow et al., supra note 186.
188 William A. Gamson, From Outsiders to Insiders: Changing Perceptions of Emotional
Culture and Consciousness Among Social Movement Scholars, 16 MOBILIZATION 251,
251–52 (2011).
189 William A. Gamson, The Social Psychology of Collective Action, in FRONTIERS IN
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 53, 54 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992);
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focuses on the costs and benefits of action and seeks to predict when groups
will be able to mobilize resources of time and money to achieve change. Other
theories also developed, within the larger body of social movement theory,
which focused on structural elements to predict when people will engage in
collective action.190 Recently, social movement theorists have focused on the
relation between movements and the state, calling themselves political process
theorists.191 Social movement theorists have also sought to add social psychol-
ogy,192 culture,193 and emotions back into the theories.194 Thus, different argu-
ments within social movement theory draw on a number of disciplines in
addition to sociology, such as economics and psychology, to seek to explain
different facets of a social movement.
This section describes three illustrative arguments from different groups of
thinkers within social movement theory and applies them to historical examples
of co-ops in the United States.195 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward
have developed an argument with a structural focus to explain the success and
failure of poor people’s movements. While Piven and Cloward focus on chal-
lenge to institutions, John D. McCarthy and Mark Wolfson focus on how
movements, especially those with widespread support, can co-opt civil and
state structures for use in mobilizing people to bring about social change. While
both groups of thinkers recognize the importance of social psychology, they do
not directly attempt to explain the psychology of movement participants. Wil-
liam A. Gamson has focused on developing an argument addressing the social
psychology underlying a social movement. Its focus on solidarity, collective
identity, consciousness, and micromobilization illuminates aspects of an indi-
vidual’s motivation that a structural argument does not. For each group of
thinkers, the subsection suggests areas of future inquiry in order to develop
further the explanatory power of social movement theory. While clearly not a
scientific testing of the sociological arguments,196 the application of the argu-
ments to historical examples should nevertheless provide some valuable
insights into the helpfulness of social movement theory in explaining move-
ments toward worker participation.
Carol McClurg Mueller, Building Social Movement Theory, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVE-
MENT THEORY, supra, at 3, 3.
190 Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper, Introduction, in RETHINKING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
STRUCTURE, MEANING, AND EMOTION, supra note 19, at vii, vii–viii; see generally FRANCES
FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED,
HOW THEY FAIL (Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1977).
191 Goodwin & Jasper, supra note 190.
192 Gamson, supra note 189; William A. Gamson, Commitment and Agency in Social Move-
ments, 6 SOC. F. 27, 28 (1991).
193 Goodwin & Jasper, supra note 190, at viii.
194 Id. at vii.
195 In the interest of space, the author selected three arguments. As discussed above, there
are many arguments with different focuses, but the hope is to capture the basic insights of
several.
196 The sample of co-ops is not random, and the manner of application is not objective.
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A. Piven & Cloward’s Structural Conflict Argument
This subsection describes Piven and Cloward’s argument and applies it to
the five previously discussed examples of co-ops197 in order to assess the
explanatory power of a structurally focused theory within the body of social
movement theory and offer insights into further areas of inquiry.
1. The Argument
Piven and Cloward have developed a widely recognized argument, exem-
plifying a structurally focused theory of social movements. They state that
while they do not wish to “proliferate idiosyncratic” definitions, they believe
that the difference between their definition of a social movement and that of
others is “no mere definitional quibble.”198 Piven and Cloward describe the
protest movements they seek to explain as requiring “a transformation both of
consciousness and of behavior.”199 The change in consciousness involves the
system losing legitimacy and ordinary fatalistic people asserting rights and
believing they have a capacity to change the situation.200 The change in behav-
ior involves masses of people becoming defiant and acting out that defiance as
a group.201 Piven and Cloward do not believe an articulated social change goal
is the defining feature of a social movement and distinguish between the mass
movement and the formalized organizations arising from movements.202 Piven
and Cloward’s definition focuses on defiance.203 In later work, Piven specifies
that movements result from “networks of specialized and interdependent
activities.”204
Piven and Cloward begin with the premise that protest is structurally pre-
cluded most of the time.205 Piven and Cloward’s first hypothesis is that a
breakdown in regulatory institutions is a more important factor in leading to
protest than an economic push of either good or bad times.206 The greater the
197 See discussion supra Part I.
198 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 4. Their work has been cited by other legal
scholars. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New
Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806–07 n.2 (2008); Steven Shiffrin, The
Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 715 n.145
(1994).
199 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 3. This transformation involves recognizing
interdependence and solidarity. FRANCES FOX PIVEN, CHALLENGING AUTHORITY: HOW ORDI-
NARY PEOPLE CHANGE AMERICA 27–29 (2006).
200 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 3–4.
201 Id. at 4.
202 Id. at 4–5.
203 Id. at 5.
204 PIVEN, supra note 199, at 20. See also Richard A. Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, Dis-
ruption and Organization: A Rejoinder, 13 THEORY AND SOC’Y 587, 588–89 (1984).
205 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 7.
206 Id. at 8–10. They do recognize that “economic change may be so jarring as to virtually
destroy the structures and routines of daily life.” Id. at 10. They also discuss how the rules of
work pattern each day, and work underpins the stability of other social institutions. Id. at 11.
But they stress periods of profound social dislocation. Id. at 14; PIVEN, supra note 199, at 21
(describing leverage resulting from “the breakdown of institutionally regulated cooperation,”
such as with workplace strikes, student strikes, boycotts, or riots); Cloward & Piven, supra
note 204, at 589 (stressing importance of deregulating effects of large-scale institutional
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scale of distress and breakdown in the structures and routines of daily life, the
more likely a protest movement will arise.207 In addition, elites may contribute
to people’s reappraising their situation as a collective plight.208
Piven and Cloward also hypothesize that the form a protest movement
takes is “determined by the institutional context in which people live and
work.”209 They predict that defiance will first be expressed at the polls,210
prompting political leaders to respond to the dissatisfaction and to shape the
form of the demands protestors articulate.211 Piven and Cloward also predict
that “it is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances, estab-
lishes the measure of their demands, and points out the targets of their
anger.”212 Some institutions, like a factory, draw people together while others,
like work based upon casual labor, disperse rather than aggregate people.213
Finally, people rebel against rules and authorities associated with their every-
day activity.214
Piven and Cloward explain that mass defiance will have more limited
impact in some circumstances than in others.215 Piven and Cloward state that
“the most useful way to think about the effectiveness of protest is to examine
the disruptive effects on institutions of different forms of mass defiance, and
then to examine the political reverberations of those disruptions.”216 How influ-
ential a disruption is depends on whether the contribution withheld is crucial,
whether those affected have resources to concede, and whether the protestors
can protect themselves from reprisals.217 Political response to disruption can
take the form of ignoring, repressing, or conciliating the movement.218 Leaders
will ignore movements that disrupt institutions that are not central to society
and repress those affecting central institutions.219 But, in times of massive
breakdown, leaders may conciliate the movement because their relationships to
their constituents are uncertain, and they are more vulnerable than usual.220
Leaders will offer concessions and try to co-opt movement participants. These
measures may “be designed” to undermine public support for the movement
and open the way for repression.221 “[T]aken together, these efforts to concili-
ate and disarm usually lead to the demise of the protest movement, partly by
change). In later work, Piven recognizes that “new hardships or new opportunities” can spur
concerted action over time. PIVEN, supra note 199, at 32.
207 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 12–13.
208 Id. at 13.
209 Id. at 14.
210 Id. at 15.
211 Id. at 17.
212 Id. at 20–21; see PIVEN, supra note 199, at 34.
213 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 21. See also Frances Fox Piven, Mobilizing the
Jobless, NATION (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/157292/mobilizing-job
less (discussing how unemployed are disaggregated unlike students or workers).
214 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 21.
215 Id. at 23.
216 Id. at 24.
217 Id. at 25.
218 Id. at 27.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 28; see PIVEN, supra note 199, at 21.
221 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 30.
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transforming the movement itself, and partly by transforming the political cli-
mate which nourishes protest.”222 Reforms that last are those that are not
incompatible with the interest of powerful elite groups.223
Finally, Piven and Cloward predict a limited role for protest leaders.224
They claim protest is not created by organizers and leaders.225 Leaders do make
choices within the above-described institutional limits, but they can only fail if
they try to move beyond those limits.226
As to the role of law, Piven and Cloward postulate that rules result from
power struggles between groups, and some groups promulgate or enforce rules
to cut off political resources or limit their use by opposing groups.227 Rulemak-
ing “is a strategy that creates new and lasting constraints on subsequent politi-
cal action.”228
2. The Argument Applied to the Co-ops
This subsection applies Piven and Cloward’s argument to the Plywood co-
ops, Hoedads, Denver Yellow Cab, Rath, and International Poultry, and dis-
cusses the explanatory power of the argument.
a. To the Plywood Co-ops
The movement founding the Plywood co-ops does not fit comfortably
within Piven & Cloward’s definition of a protest movement because the work-
ers do not appear to have been asserting rights or acting defiantly but instead to
have been seeking a financial investment and job security. The argument may,
however, still offer limited insight about the movement.
To the extent the argument recognizes that lack of employment causes a
breakdown in the routine of everyday life, such a breakdown does appear to be
one impetus for the founding of some of these co-ops. The new open market for
plywood was another. Other factors, such as Scandinavian descent and availa-
bility of resources, fit less well within the argument.
The institutional context in which the workers lived likely influenced their
turn toward founding plywood cooperatives. They lived in an area where the
timber industry thrived, and, after the founding of Olympia Veneer, the co-op
was a visible working institution for plywood production. The political context,
however, was probably less determinative than the theory suggests. There is
little mention in the literature about the Plywood co-ops members’ expression
of defiance at the polls or about the response of political leaders to the founda-
tion of the first plywood co-ops.229 Criminal charges were brought against
222 Id. at 32.
223 Id. at 35; PIVEN, supra note 199, at 109.
224 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 36–37.
225 Id. at 36.
226 Id. at 36–37.
227 Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Normalizing Collective Protest, in FRON-
TIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, supra note 189, at 301, 302.
228 Id.
229 Later, the co-ops were involved in legal matters, particularly tax matters, but these did
not bear on the founding of the co-ops. See GUNN, supra note 9, at 106. R
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some of the promoters for speculation and fraud, a likely factor in the decline
of plywood co-ops after the 1950s.230
Nevertheless, the Plywood co-ops appear to have had significant impact
because they provided a major model for alternative cooperative forms of busi-
ness in the United States. There is no showing that the founders had a crucial
contribution to withhold, aside from withholding their labor from traditional
firms. The movement seemed to have been largely ignored by political power
holders, even though it disrupted an institution central to society—the tradi-
tional investor-owned firm.
Finally, leaders appear to have taken a more significant role than the the-
ory predicts. Two organizers likely played a key role in founding Olympia
Veneer, and brokers contributed to the growth of other early co-ops.
b. To Hoedads
The movement to found Hoedads fits fairly well into Piven & Cloward’s
definition of a social movement. The early members believed they had the
capacity to change the work system, particularly reforestation jobs, from one in
which foremen treated workers poorly and the company took the bulk of the
profit to one in which laborers worked together and shared the profit. While
initially only small numbers of workers were involved, they were defiant
enough to take reforestation into their own hands, although without breaking
the law.
A breakdown in regulatory institutions does not appear to have signifi-
cantly contributed to the formation of Hoedads except to the extent the young
people who founded it appeared to lack opportunities for other work. Addition-
ally, the Hoedads cooperative was founded at a time when many people were
questioning authority and the economic system.
The daily experience of two of the founders, who were working reforesta-
tion for a large timber company, definitely shaped the form of their grievances.
It was while working this job that they realized that, although the work itself
was somewhat satisfying, working for a large company was not. And it was an
understanding of the way in which the work was contracted that led them to
include self-contracted work among their demands. They did not, however,
express dissatisfaction at the polls.
Hoedads’ impact was significant because it established an alternative to a
traditional privately held firm. Yet, the workers did not seem to have had any-
thing significant to withhold, other than relatively dispensable labor, and, ini-
tially, political leaders did not appear to have been involved in any manner.231
The role of leaders was much more significant than the theory predicts
because the initial three founders relied on their networks and recruiting to
build the movement, and encouraged its growth during difficult times. The law
ultimately contributed because it permitted formation of a cooperative corpora-
tion, rather than constraining this possibility.
230 See id. at 104.
231 Over time, the forestry department provided many of the contracts, and the co-op mem-
bers became politically involved. HARTZELL, supra note 81, at 71, 217, 289.
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c. To Denver Yellow Cab
The movement to establish Denver Yellow Cab as a co-op fits squarely
within Piven & Cloward’s definition of a protest movement. The drivers
believed they had a right to run the company and defiantly acted to make this a
reality.
As the argument predicts, breakdown in regulatory institutions seemed to
allow for the movement more than any economic push. The prior strike created
a situation in which the cab drivers were able to try running an independent
company, and the holding company’s need for a buyer created the possibility of
making the co-op a reality. The role that elites may have played in defining the
situation is difficult to assess, but it does not seem many people outside the
company were involved.
The institutional context definitely determined the form of the drivers’
protest. While the drivers did not, to our knowledge, express dissatisfaction at
the polls, their work drew them together. They demonstrated a strong sense of
solidarity despite their being independent contractors, a type of worker the the-
ory suggests is less likely to unite. Their protest took the forms of paying union
dues, striking, running an alternate company and, finally, establishing the co-
op—all forms of protest directed against their everyday work rules and at the
company.
The cab drivers’ movement had significant impact because, as the argu-
ment predicts, the drivers had a crucial contribution to withhold, and the com-
pany had resources to concede. Without the cab drivers, the company could not
operate, as had become apparent during the earlier strike, and the holding com-
pany had the entire company to concede, since it was looking for a buyer. This
substantial economic change came about without any, to the author’s knowl-
edge, major political reverberations. The strong emphasis the argument places
on political disruption is interesting, since Piven and Cloward themselves point
out that economic power is generally more important and determinate than
political power.232 Perhaps the argument should be modified to allow that a
substantial disruption of an economic institution is enough to constitute suc-
cessful social change.
Finally, while the leadership arose out of the cab drivers’ ongoing struggle
and initiative in forming their own union, the leadership clearly played a more
central role than that which the argument predicts. The union leaders formu-
lated the idea of buying the co-op and mobilized the drivers and other employ-
ees to support the idea.
d. To Rath
The movement toward worker control of Rath Packing does not fit com-
fortably within Piven & Cloward’s definition of a protest movement because it
is difficult to ascertain whether the workers were asserting rights, beyond the
right to hold a job, and to assess how defiant they were. The argument may,
however, still offer insight about the movement.
A breakdown in regulatory institutions is not indicated because the com-
pany had not quite gone out of business. The company’s poor performance did,
232 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 190, at 2–3.
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however, create a great economic push, placing jobs and the local economy at
risk. Those elites who formed the County Economic Development Committee
influenced people to view the situation as one of community plight.
Again, while not known, dissatisfaction was likely expressed at the polls.
The daily routine of the workers appears to have shaped the form the move-
ment took to the extent the union was involved and tried to create control for
the workers. To the extent that other community members were involved, how-
ever, the model’s prediction that people protest rules and authorities with whom
they have everyday contact breaks down. These community members identified
Rath as a community problem whether or not they worked at or with Rath on a
daily basis.
Whether the movement had anything to withhold from Rath is also
unclear. The union could withhold work, but then the company would fail. The
change to a co-op likely came about through cooperation among the company,
union, and community; something the argument does not predict. It could be
claimed, as the argument suggests, that the concession of allowing workers to
name the majority on the board of directors was designed to conciliate the
workers so that ultimately the traditional hierarchy could reassert itself at the
company. This would help explain the limits to the ongoing changes made at
Rath.
Leaders played a very prominent role in instituting worker ownership and
participation at Rath. Their role seems to have been much larger than the argu-
ment predicts. However, the argument predicts accurately the role of law as a
constraint. When the initial trust was not approved, the workers had to spend
significant time and resources to formulate a two-tiered ESOP to meet their
goals for a cooperative business.233
e. To International Poultry
Due to sparse information available about International Poultry, whether
the movement falls within Piven and Cloward’s definition cannot be ascer-
tained. Judging from the numerous hours workers and friends spent renovating
the building, however, these workers likely were asserting their rights to work
and believed they could fix the situation. While they were not necessarily defi-
ant, they did act collectively. Thus, while the movement may not fit perfectly
into Piven and Cloward’s framework, the argument likely holds some explana-
tory power for the movement.
Clearly, the institutions regulating these women’s lives broke down when
the factory they worked at closed. However, no larger breakdown in regulatory
institutions, such as law enforcement or political structures, was apparent.
Thus, while regulatory breakdown is an important factor leading to this move-
ment, economic push may play a greater role in starting a movement toward
founding a cooperative than the argument predicts. Elites likely played a role in
the workers seeing the situation as a collective problem because the Catholic
Church and the US government were both involved in providing funding.
233 ERISA is designed with the important goal of safeguarding retirement funds. It may be
possible to do so, however, with some modifications that more easily permit employee own-
ership. See supra Part.I.D.
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Whether defiance was expressed at the polls is unclear, but the argument’s
prediction that factory work draws people together is verified here. Because the
workers were minority women, the argument perhaps should be expanded to
include gender and ethnicity as mediating factors which, in addition to work,
bring people together and shape the form of their protest. While these women
did not rebel against everyday rules and authorities, they did try to reestablish
work patterns similar to those they previously had, albeit with a different
authority structure. Clearly then, their everyday routine shaped the form their
protest took.
The argument’s predictions about when a movement will have impact do
not appear to hold great explanatory power as applied to International Poultry.
These women had little to withhold from those who provided them with grants
or from the company that went out of business. They probably had something
to withhold from the Catholic Church in terms of membership or volunteer
hours and perhaps from the community in terms of funds to buy goods for sale
and to contribute to tax revenue, but there is no evidence that they had anything
concrete to withhold. Yet, they were not ignored or repressed by political lead-
ers and were able to procure grant money. The funding does not seem to have
been a conciliation intended to undermine public support for the movement or
to open the way for repression. The ultimate failure of the cooperative had little
to do with the lack of bargaining power on the women’s part and cannot be
adequately explained by the model. Perhaps continued strong public support
may have increased the co-op’s likelihood of survival, but this is not at all
clear.
Finally, the Federation appears to have shaped the movement to a large
degree. Thus, the argument may not leave enough room for the role of
leadership.
3. Explanatory Power and Further Areas of Inquiry
Piven & Cloward’s argument best explains the type of movement that fits
neatly within the provided definition of protest movement, such as the move-
ment at Denver Cab. For such a movement, the argument’s insights that a regu-
latory breakdown is necessary for a movement to succeed and that the
movement must have something to withhold from an opposition who has some-
thing to concede are very valuable. The argument fails, however, to account for
the importance of leadership234 and for the occurrence of concrete change with-
out political reverberations. The argument might also be expanded by elucidat-
ing more specifically how gender or race, in addition to class, affect networking
and protest.
Looking at movements that do not fall neatly within the definition of a
protest movement clarifies that economic push often plays a much greater role
than that for which the argument predicts. Additionally, in certain circum-
stances, such as with Rath and International Poultry, cooperation rather than
bargaining power on the part of the movement leads to some level of success.
234 See Aldon Morris, Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms & Proposals, in
RETHINKING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: STRUCTURE, MEANING, AND EMOTION, supra note 19, at
233, 242 (preexisting leaders “are crucial to the initial mobilizing stage”).
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Perhaps in these cases, Piven & Cloward’s argument about how conciliation
leads to a decrease in public support and a reassertion of the status quo can
begin to explain the limited success of these movements.
Finally, the recognition of the role of law in constraining social movement
action is significant and could be further developed to explain when law can
contribute to the success of a movement and when it limits success.
B. McCarthy & Wolfson’s Cooptation Through Consensus Argument
This section describes McCarthy & Wolfson’s argument, which perhaps
illustrates a resource mobilization theory within the body of social movement
theory, applies the argument to the five previously discussed co-ops, and
explores its explanatory power, offering areas of potential further inquiry.235
1. The argument
McCarthy and Wolfson develop an argument of how movements use insti-
tutions that are already in place to meet their goals.236 McCarthy and Wolfson
use the following definition of a social movement: “A social movement is a set
of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing
some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a soci-
ety.”237 McCarthy and Wolfson’s argument starts with the proposition that
using preexisting networks of relations makes mobilization “more likely and
less costly.”238 They see both civic structures and state structures as available
for cooptation by social movements.239 McCarthy and Wolfson also explicitly
mention that their theory of cooptation should apply to other institutions,
including businesses.240 Additionally, they mention the importance of govern-
ment support to successful social movements.241
235 McCarthy’s work is cited by other legal scholars. See e.g., Constance A. Nathanson,
Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 421, 422 (1999); Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local
Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 942 n.344 (2011); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Sarah
Rebecca Katz, Martyrs, the Media and the Web: Examining a Grassroots Children’s Rights
Movement Through the Lens of Social Movement Theory, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 121, 130 (2005).
236 John D. McCarthy & Mark Wolfson, Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and
the Cooptation of Civic and State Infrastructures, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THE-
ORY, supra note 189, at 273. In a later work, McCarthy and a co-author recognize cooptation
of an institution as one mechanism of resource access, including others that can also lead to
successful social movements. See Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social
Movement Mobilization, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra
note 186, at 116, 134–35.
237 McCarthy & Wolfson, supra note 236, at 275 (internal quotations omitted).
238 Id. at 278. This idea is supported by Gamson’s theory discussed infra Part II.C.
239 McCarthy & Wolfson, supra note 236, at 274. In a later work, however, McCarthy and a
co-author theorize that being part of another organization may decrease probability of sur-
vival as those in the parent organization switch priorities. Bob Edwards & John D. McCar-
thy, Strategy Matters: The Contingent Value of Social Capital in the Survival of Local Social
Movement Organizations, 83 SOC. FORCES 621, 635 (2004).
240 McCarthy & Wolfson, supra note 236, at 292.
241 Id. at 287–88. McCarthy also recognizes that government support can constrain the ben-
efiting group. Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 236, at 121.
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McCarthy and Wolfson predict that three processes will facilitate or con-
strain the cooptation of a social structure.242 First, internal characteristics of the
structure will influence whether it can be co-opted.243 Widespread member sol-
idarity and loyalty to the civic or state organization makes it less likely dissi-
dents to the social movement’s goals will oppose cooptation.244 The ability of
leaders to sanction potential dissidents, the distribution of power, and hierar-
chies of status within the structure are likely to influence its cooptability.245
Finally, the less organized the dissidents within the structure, the more likely
cooptation is to result.246
Second, relations between the local structure being co-opted and other
structures will influence the likelihood of cooptation.247 These ties can be
based on levels of formal authority or intragroup solidarity based on history and
overlapping interpersonal networks.248 The greater the number of external
links, the greater the likelihood that cooptation will not succeed because some
linked group will be opposed.249
Third, the ways in which cooptation is attempted influence the likelihood
of success.250 As noted above, as consensus declines, the likelihood of coopta-
tion should decline.251 Continuing cooptation is probably easier than initiating
it because of sunk costs.252 Those with more authority are more likely to suc-
ceed in cooptation attempts.253 Where sentiments are strong in favor of the
movement and diversion of resources is permissible, forthright advocacy of
cooptation should succeed.254 Also, resources such as infrastructure, materials,
and labor will be available only to the extent they have not been previously
committed.255 The argument describes four means of accessing resources: 1)
aggregation, whereby individuals convert their own resources into collective
resources;256 2) self-production, whereby movement leaders create or add value
to resources provided by the other methods;257 3) cooptation and appropriation,
whereby, as focused on before, existing relationships are exploited;258 and 4)
242 McCarthy & Wolfson, supra note 236, at 280.
243 Id. at 281.
244 Id. at 280–81.
245 Id. at 281.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 281–82.
249 Id. at 282.
250 Id. at 280.
251 Id. at 282.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 283.
255 Id. In a later work, McCarthy and a co-author develop a typology of five types of
resources: 1) moral, 2) cultural, 3) social-organizational, 4) human, and 5) material. Edwards
& McCarthy, supra note 236, at 117. The first resource, moral, overlaps with consideration
about solidarity and loyalty, and social-organizational resources overlaps both with consider-
ation of co-opting social structures and solidarity and loyalty.
256 Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 236, at 131. Here, they focus on moral resources by
publicizing those who support the goals of the group or cultural resources such as organizing
conferences.
257 Id. at 134. Here, they include collective-action frames, literature, and issue campaigns.
258 Id.
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patronage, whereby an individual or organization provides resources.259
McCarthy and Wolfson also theorize that sheer effort put into organizing will
increase the resources mobilized.260 In a later work, McCarthy and a co-author
emphasize the availability of resources and point out that unequal resources
mean that different social movements have greater or lesser ability to
succeed.261
2. McCarthy and Wolfson applied
This subsection applies McCarthy and Wolfson’s argument to the Ply-
wood co-ops, Hoedads, Denver Yellow Cab, Rath, and International Poultry.
All of the movements to found cooperatives fit neatly into the broad definition
of a social movement which they use.
a. To the Plywood co-ops
The argument’s focus on cooptation of existing institutions makes it only
marginally helpful in explaining the rise of the plywood co-ops. The founders
of many of the early co-ops, including Olympia Veneer, did not co-opt any
company or other institution already in place.262 Indeed Olympia Veneer’s
members built the plant themselves. The workers probably did benefit, how-
ever, in mobilizing other members from preexisting networks of workers with
shared Scandinavian descent.
Additionally, government support does appear to have contributed to the
successful founding of the plywood co-ops, some having received loans from
the Small Business Administration and some intending to benefit from co-op
tax treatment. The availability of resources also contributes to an explanation of
the successful founding of the co-ops. The founding members aggregated
resources by paying for initial shares and paying membership fees, and they
relied on added value to secure bank loans and loans from friends.
b. To Hoedads
Like many of the Plywood co-ops, Hoedads did not co-opt an existing
structure, again making the argument only marginally helpful in explaining the
founding of the Hoedads cooperative. Hoedads did not benefit from any gov-
ernment support to aid its founding. The founders did use preexisting networks
of relations, recruiting college friends and using the town grapevine to increase
their membership. Interestingly, however, during the initial couple of years,
they recruited a significant number of new members by simply placing a job
advertisement.263 The resources used were primarily aggregation of individual
resources because they financed the co-op through membership fees, used per-
259 Id. at 135 (“Government contracts, foundation grants, and large private donations are the
most common forms of financial patronage . . . .”).
260 John D. McCarthy & Mark Wolfson, Resource Mobilization by Local Social Movement
Organizations: Agency, Strategy, and Organization in the Movement Against Drinking and
Driving, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 1070, 1071–72 (1996).
261 Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 236, at 117.
262 Some plywood co-ops bought out traditional firms. GUNN, supra note 9, at 103. R
263 HARTZELL, supra note 81, at 107–08.
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sonal income to purchase tools, and used individually or collectively held land,
vehicles, and personal belongings to bond contracts.
c. To Denver Yellow Cab
The movement toward establishing the co-op at Denver Yellow Cab suc-
cessfully co-opted the union structure. The movement mobilized the workers
through the union and used the strike fund, created for an entirely different
purpose, to buy the company. The internal characteristics of the union are those
that the theory predicts will result in successful cooptation. The drivers were
very loyal to the union, and the union leaders supported the idea of worker
ownership and control. No organized group of dissenters within the union
appears to have existed.
Also, as the argument predicts, the union had no ties to other organiza-
tions. The workers had purposefully formed a local independent union that was
not part of an affiliation or national authority structure.
Sentiments were strong in favor of the movement, and forthrightly advo-
cating use of the union to buy out the company succeeded. The strike funds,
even though ostensibly committed as a strike security fund, were used, which
somewhat contradicts the argument’s prediction that only previously uncom-
mitted resources will be available. Further explanation of what constitutes prior
commitment of resources and in what types of circumstances resources might
be diverted might be fruitful. To the extent the strike fund was already funded,
this would constitute appropriation of collective resources, and, to the extent
members raised their strike fund payments, could constitute conversion of indi-
vidual to collective resources. The members’ reliance on a bank loan might
constitute self-production.
d. To Rath
As the argument recognizes, government support was important to the
success of the movement to take over Rath. The US Department of Commerce
provided the grant for a consultant to conduct a feasibility study, and the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development provided a grant for the
buyout.
The cooptation of the union local was also critical to the success of the
buyout. While detailed information is not available, it appears that the internal
characteristics predicted by the argument to facilitate cooptation existed. Many
members appeared to be loyal to the union, with approximately 40 percent ulti-
mately buying into the ESOP.264 Additionally, the union president and other
local union officials clearly supported and pushed for the buyout. If there were
any dissidents, they must have been disorganized.
As to external relations, the link to the international union, which did not
support the formation of the co-op, probably did make the success of the move-
ment less likely, as the argument predicted. Additionally, however, networks to
the Black Hawk County Economic Development Committee must have been in
place. This link appears to have assisted rather than hindered the movement.
264 Redmon et al., supra note 146, at 8.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 29 24-APR-14 14:44
350 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:322
Perhaps developing the argument to predict which types of external links will
further rather than limit the success of a social movement would be useful.
Many of the ways in which the cooptation of the union took place also
mirror the predicted means that will influence success of a movement. For
instance, the union officers leading the movement possessed great authority,
and diversion of resources was permissible. While the resources were otherwise
committed to wages and benefits, they were nevertheless used.265 The members
used several means of accessing resources, including aggregating their own
resources by depositing wage and benefit concessions into the escrow account
to fund the buyout, and relying on patronage—the grant supplied by the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
e. To International Poultry
Consistent with the argument, the Connecticut Federation for Economic
Democracy and the workers used existing government and church institutions
to advance their movement to establish International Poultry as a worker coop-
erative. While they did not appear to completely co-opt any of these institu-
tions, the argument may still hold some explanatory power. As recognized by
the argument, government support was important. They relied on loans from
the Community Services Administration and the US Small Business
Administration.
While information is lacking about the internal structure of the Connecti-
cut Federation for Economic Democracy and the state and church institutions, a
group loyal enough to spend hours renovating the building existed. The work-
ers and the Federation appear to have had external links to other groups, given
that the Industrial Cooperative Association helped secure the funds and inter-
ested individuals contributed funding. These links, however, do not seem to
have led to opposition to the movement.266
The Federation and the workers were able to obtain many types of
resources, none of which look to have been previously committed to other uses,
as predicted by the argument. The workers and their friends converted individ-
ual resources, specifically their labor, into a collective resource by renovating
the building. The loans were most likely patronage in this instance because they
were probably given with the knowledge that they were not likely to be paid
back.
3. Explanatory Power and Areas for Further Inquiry
The argument’s focus on cooptation and preexisting networks of relations
has substantial explanatory power. In three of the five movements, existing
structures, such as a union, a church, or a state structure, were at least partially
diverted to achieving the movement goals and, in another, preexisting relation-
ships clearly contributed to recruitment. The movement at Denver Yellow Cab
also illustrates that the argument is correct to identify the importance of the co-
265 See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (suggesting more detailed investigation of when appar-
ently committed resources are still available for diversion to social movement purposes).
266 Instead, competition from other businesses accounted for the short-lived movement.
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opted organization’s leaders supporting the movement goals and of the mem-
bers having a high degree of loyalty to the leaders and co-opted institution.
Several areas for further inquiry are suggested. The argument recognizes
that government support is important, and several of the case studies illustrate
the importance of this proposition. Yet, government support does not appear to
have been significant in the founding of Hoedads and Denver Yellow Cab.
Further exploration of when government support is important is warranted.
Another area for further inquiry is to detail when external links hinder the
success of a movement and when they further it. Success might, for instance,
depend on the geographic proximity, hierarchical relationship, or overlap of
goals between the organizations.
Elaboration on when a movement is likely to succeed without fully co-
opting an organization, such as by partial cooptation or reliance on preexisting
non-institutionalized networks would be interesting. Also, in job creation situa-
tions such as co-ops, preexisting networks may play a less significant role if
personal private income is used as an incentive to join, as it was with Hoedads.
Finally, further explanation of how movement members access various
types of resources would be helpful. The argument could explain why, in some
instances, resources that are ostensibly otherwise committed are nevertheless
available to movement members and how members can access outside sources
of funding, such as patronage.
C. Gamson’s Social Psychological Argument
This section describes Gamson’s social psychological argument and then
illuminates how this type of social psychological theory within the body of
social movement theory adds to the explanatory power of more structural theo-
ries by using Denver Yellow Cab as an example.
1. The Argument
Gamson’s argument focuses on “the mesh between self and society.”267
Despite his focus on emotions, Gamson recognizes that social movement theo-
rists must work to understand underlying structural conditions as well.268 He
points out that preexisting social relationships are critical to recruitment and
267 Gamson, supra note 189, at 55. Gamson’s work has frequently been relied on by other
legal scholars. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 551, 558–59 (2011); Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other
(Im)possible Paths Toward Community Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
353, 361–62 (2001); Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, A Deadly Complexity: Law, Social
Movements and Political Violence, 16 MINN. J. INTL. L. 265, 295 n.115 (2007); Fredrick C.
Harris, Specifying the Mechanism Linking Dissent to Action, 89 B.U. L. REV. 605, 606
(2009); Huey, supra note 13, at 705; Nathanson, supra note 235; Sharon E. Preves, Out of
the O.R. and into the Streets: Exploring the Impact of Intersex Media Activism, 12 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 247, 252 (2005); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2724 n.187 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1323, 1357 n.87 (2006).
268 Gamson, supra note 188, at 257. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 31 24-APR-14 14:44
352 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:322
mobilization.269 He uses the concepts of collective identity, solidarity, con-
sciousness, and micromobilization to explain why people take collective action.
Collective identity is “how individuals’ sense of who they are becomes
engaged with a definition shared by coparticipants in some effort at social
change—that is, with who ‘we’ are.”270 Gamson claims that participation in a
movement offers fulfillment and realization of self and enlarges a participant’s
personal identity.271 The “we” must be “elaborated and given meaning.”272
This can succeed because of effective leadership,273 workable movement
forms, or because an identity was already established among participants.274
“To measure” collective identity, “one would ask people about the meaning of
labels and other cultural symbols,” such as a T-shirt or haircut, “not about their
own personal identity.”275 Gamson theorizes that a collective identity defining
a person as belonging to a broader movement is the strongest type of collective
identity and also the most difficult to develop.276
Solidarity is “how individuals develop and maintain loyalty and commit-
ment to collective actors—that is, to groups or organizations who act as carriers
of social movements.”277 Bruce Fireman and Gamson list five factors that con-
tribute to solidarity: 1) having friends and relatives in a movement; 2) partici-
pating in communal institutions; 3) sharing techniques for dealing with
problems of daily life; 4) sharing a set of subordinate or superordinate relations;
and 5) having a basis for others to readily identify someone as a member of a
group.278 Gamson discusses how some movements create protected environ-
ments within existing communal institutions and formalize networks into
“affinity group[s].”279 In a successful movement, these techniques to create
solidarity must be balanced against the need to have a leader or leaders who can
speak for the group and to allow for liberty within close-knit relations.280
Consciousness is “how the meaning that individuals give to a social situa-
tion becomes a shared definition implying collective action.”281 Consciousness
is the process through which actors actively engage and rearrange the con-
structed meanings that are offered to them.282 Movements must offer partici-
269 Gamson, supra note 189, at 60.
270 Id. at 55.
271 Id. at 60.
272 Id. at 57.
273 In other work, Gamson notes the necessity of strategic leadership roles being filled. See
Betsy Leondar-Wright & William A. Gamson, Social Movements, in POLITICAL AND CIVIC
LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 349, 349 (Richard A. Couto ed., 2010).
274 Gamson, supra note 189, at 57.
275 Id. at 60.
276 Leondar-Wright & Gamson, supra note 273, at 354–55.
277 Gamson, supra note 189, at 55.
278 Bruce Fireman & William A. Gamson, Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization
Perspective 22 (Univ. of Mich. Ctr. for Research on Soc. Org., Working Paper No. 153),
available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/50928/153.pdf?se
quence=1.
279 Gamson, supra note 189, at 62–63.
280 Id. at 64.
281 Id. at 55.
282 Id. at 67. This process is often referred to as “framing” in the social movement theory
literature. See e.g., id. at 65, 67; Leondar-Wright & Gamson, supra note 273, at 350.
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pants a system of meaning, which says that those who share it can and should
do something about the identified problem.283 A system of meaning that pro-
vides a more coherent explanation than another will be more likely to succeed
in mobilizing people.284 Also, media will influence the likelihood that people
will adopt a certain movement’s meanings.285 In later work, Gamson recog-
nizes that factors such as gender, race and ethnicity, social class, age, region,
issue, and political moment affect consciousness.286
Micromobilization deals with what types of words or deeds further the
mobilization process.287 “An organizing act is one that increases the capacity
of the potential challengers to act as a unit.”288 These acts take place in infor-
mal interactions between members.289 “Divesting acts, another type of mobiliz-
ing act, are necessary to break the bonds of authority that keep people
quiescent.”290 Reframing acts are ones that demonstrate that movement partici-
pants share a set of meaning and are aware that they share them.291 This pro-
cess takes time and cannot normally happen in a single encounter.292 The
processes of micromobilization are present in creating collective identity, soli-
darity, and consciousness.293
2. Gamson Applied to Denver Yellow Cab
The drivers at Denver Yellow Cab clearly had a collective identity, soli-
darity, and consciousness, which enabled them to form a co-op. The cab drivers
had a strong collective identity as drivers linked together through their work
and their independent union. The development of this “we” appears, as the
argument would predict, to have come about both from the drivers’ preexisting
ties due to work and through the effort of the union leadership. While specific
types of symbols, such as union buttons or signs, that may have indicated col-
lective identity are not known, cultural symbols of the drivers’ collective iden-
tity probably existed. One area of further inquiry for the argument is to identify
what factors create such a preexisting identity for a diverse group who work
independently of each other and how, under these circumstances, shared work
brings forth a collective identity.
The drivers also had strong solidarity, as the argument would predict.
Three of the five conditions listed by Fireman and Gamson were present. The
drivers participated in the union together. They shared techniques for daily life
and had the same set of subordinate relations to the company. The movement
283 Gamson, supra note 189, at 68.
284 Id. at 71.
285 Id. See also William A. Gamson, Constructing Social Protest, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND CULTURE, 85, 86 (Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans eds., l995) (media includes not
only news but also advertisement slogans and movies).
286 Leondar-Wright & Gamson, supra note 273, at 350.
287 Gamson, supra note 189, at 71–72.
288 Id. at 72.
289 Id.
290 Id. (emphasis omitted).
291 Id. at 73.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 55.
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had strong leadership and allowed the drivers much liberty in spite of the strong
solidarity among the members.
The movement offered the drivers a system of meaning in which they
believed they should have control of their work and managed to gain that con-
trol by buying out the business and starting a co-op. The idea of forming a co-
op had been around for many years, and the possibility seemed credible, based
on the drivers’ experience running the alternate service during the strike. Thus,
the argument accurately predicts that a coherent system of meaning will mobil-
ize people. In this instance, however, no media influence is indicated.
The concepts of collective identity, solidarity, and consciousness appear to
be important to the success of a movement. Standing alone, however, these
concepts cannot explain under what circumstances a movement arises. As
Gamson realizes, these concepts need to be integrated into a larger structural
framework, such as that presented by Piven & Cloward or McCarthy & Wolf-
son.294 Integrated social movement theory using structural and social-psycho-
logical arguments provides a better explanation than either standing on its
own.295 The social-psychological argument might also delve more deeply into
individual psychology to predict when collective identity, solidarity, and con-
sciousness are likely to arise, and might investigate further how leadership
skills are acquired and deployed to explain collective identity and
micromobilization.296
III. INSIGHTS FOR THOSE WORKING TO FOUND WORKER CO-OPS
What insights does social movement theory offer unions, economic devel-
opers, and others interested in establishing worker co-ops? First, surveying the
social movement theory literature suggests that the conditions which give rise
to a movement toward founding cooperatives are at most times highly unlikely.
The literature makes us profoundly aware of the many obstacles a movement
must overcome and the many restraints any movement faces. The application of
the arguments to the historical examples indicates that founding a worker co-op
tends to happen during instances of regulatory breakdown for the workers or
for the community, or at least requires an economic push or market opening.
Social movement theory does, however, offer some important insight into
the creation of movements to establish co-ops. Because the institutional context
in which people live shapes the manner in which they choose to assert their
rights, living in an area with examples of working co-ops is likely to foster new
efforts to found co-ops, as occurred with the early plywood co-ops.
294 Gamson recognizes that many of the central insights of psychology can be integrated
into a resource mobilization perspective. Id. at 59.
295 See Doug McAdam, Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement: Toward a More Syn-
thetic Understanding of the Origins of Contention, in RETHINKING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
STRUCTURE, MEANING, AND EMOTION, supra note 19, at 201, 207 (proposing more focus on
social psychology and culture within structural paradigm).
296 See Marshall Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Move-
ments, in RETHINKING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: STRUCTURE, MEANING, AND EMOTION, supra
note 19, at 177, 180 (discussing how “strategic capacity of a leadership team” can advance
or hinder social movement).
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Additionally, social movement theory indicates that movements to estab-
lish co-ops are prone to arise out of the cooptation of structures intended for
other purposes. In two of the movements, Denver Yellow Cab and Rath, unions
were co-opted, a circumstance that aided the successful founding of the move-
ment. Since cooptation is most likely to succeed where leaders favor the move-
ment, educating union leaders and enlisting their support for cooperative
structures should aid the establishment of cooperatives.297 Because member-
ship loyalty is also important to successful cooptation, measures taken by
unions to create solidarity among members should also contribute to the suc-
cess of movements to co-opt unions for the establishment of co-ops.298 Denver
Yellow Cab illustrates the fact that a long history of solidarity can contribute to
the success of a movement to found a co-op. Of course, unionization rates are
extremely low today and, in work places without unions to co-opt, some other
institution might be available to mobilize people.299 For example, the Connecti-
cut Federation for Economic Democracy, government institutions, and a church
were important to the founding of the International Poultry cooperative in the
absence of a union. Although, as Piven & Cloward assert, structures not located
in the workplace are less likely to be used for cooptation, there are cases in
which this has occurred. Whatever the structure to be co-opted, members
should think in advance about how ties between the co-optable institution and
other institutions may help or hinder the success of the movement. A lack of
external ties may make cooptation easier, as demonstrated by Denver Yellow
Cab and the friction that the movement at Rath caused with the international
union. But in some instances, such as International Poultry, many external ties
did not appear to hinder, and indeed probably helped, the success of the
movement.
The application of the various arguments also illustrates the importance of
leadership. Several of the historical examples, such as Olympia Veneer and
Hoedads, started with just two or three people working together toward a vision
of recruiting others and founding a co-op. Indeed, all the social movement theo-
rists agree that preexisting social networks are very important to the success of
a movement, and the application of the theories to the co-ops illustrates this.
Thus, those who are unable to co-opt an already existing structure, such as a
297 Tricia McTague has outlined some of the concerns some union leaders have about
employee ownership, including the desire for income differences to recognize skill and ten-
ure differences, a concern about whipsawing, a concern ownership will be used as a union
avoidance tactic, and a fear of class collaboration diluting union member identity. Tricia
McTague, Presentation at the IAFEP Conference and Beyster Symposium, Unions and
Employee Ownership: What Do We Know? (July 14, 2012). Each of these concerns likely
can be addressed, and education of leaders about cooperatives can help lessen these con-
cerns. For instance, a cooperative can be structured to have differing wages based on skill or
tenure; union involvement alleviates fear of avoidance tactic, acquiring or starting profitable
businesses alleviates fear of whipsawing; and implementing a union co-op model with sepa-
ration of powers and ongoing education about participation may alleviate concerns about
identity.
298 Cf. GUNN, supra note 9, at 173 (“Development of a different consciousness is a long- R
term effort—one that is most likely to result from ongoing, effective, and politically aware
labor organizing.”).
299 See Aldrich & Stern, supra note 20, at 388 (noting unions and political organizations as R
potential sources of support for solidarity and purposive incentives to found cooperatives).
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union, can use preexisting networks to draw others into the movement.300
Whether relying on an existing structure or preexisting networks, leaders
should offer a coherent system of meaning about the movement and foster a
collective identity and solidarity.
Availability of resources is another key component of a successful move-
ment. Other studies of worker co-ops emphasize the importance of financing,
business plans, and marketing.301 Social movement theory can offer a typology
to help workers identify potential resources. Successful movements to found a
co-op have relied on: 1) aggregating individual resources into collective ones,
such as requiring payment for initial shares, membership fees, individual mem-
ber contribution of tools, using individually held land and personal belongings
as collateral, and depositing wage or benefits payments into a fund, or using
individual labor to build or renovate a plant; 2) added value, such as using
expected profit to secure bank loans or loans from friends; 3) appropriation of
existing collective resources, such as use of a strike fund; and 4) patronage,
such as a grant from a government entity or forgivable loans from private insti-
tutions or individuals. Social movement theory also proposes that simply work-
ing diligently to procure resources will increase the resources available.
Finally, government support is significant. As a result, efforts to seek out
government support, such as financial support from the US Small Business
Administration or favorable tax treatment, are important. Additionally, lobby-
ing government to provide education about co-ops—to people thinking about
starting small businesses or succession planning—to provide financial support,
and for legal change, may contribute to the success of a future movement to
found a cooperative.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Social movement theory suggests a dynamic interaction between move-
ments pushing for legal rights or legal change and existing law supporting or
constraining social movements. The law is only a small part of what can lead to
the success of social movements, given the structural barriers and other obsta-
cles to a successful movement to found a co-op. Nevertheless, important impli-
cations for the law that flow from the view of these historical co-ops through
the lens of social movement theory are briefly discussed.302
Because institutional context affects the form of protest, encouraging edu-
cation about worker co-ops is critical. Laws can fund educational programs
about worker co-ops, the different forms they take, and existing tax benefits for
unions, worker centers, small business owners, lawyers, accountants, and others
300 Also, while not predicted by the social movement theories, Hoedads illustrates that in
some instances promises of income might be used in addition to preexisting networks to
recruit.
301 See, e.g., Lindenfeld, supra note 9, at 345; GUNN, supra note 9, at 169 (mentioning R
necessity of funds for transition).
302 Each provides the foundation for more extensive development in a future article. And, of
course, founding a worker co-op is only a first step. Social movement theory and other
sociological theories may offer insights for law reform that would foster ongoing success of
a co-op once up and running, which is an area for further research.
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potentially involved in change of company ownership.303 The applicable laws
could be those governing federal agencies, such as the Small Business Admin-
istration, or state laws funding education, such as university employee centers
and law school development clinics.304 These programs could connect inter-
ested individuals with others working at co-ops in their area or industry.305
Then, during times of regulatory breakdown resulting from a poor economy or
simply a potential sale of one business, someone might be aware of the co-op
option. Funding or otherwise encouraging leadership programs that teach work-
ers and those involved with workplace governance issues about developing
coherent frames and encouraging collective identity and solidarity would also
help provide the foundation for a successful movement to establish a co-op.
Laws that increase unionization will likely enable the successful founda-
tion of co-ops. Unions, as workplace institutions, are likely candidates for
cooptation to found a co-op. Political gridlock decreases the probable success
of legal reforms aimed at encouraging unionization, such as the Employee Free
Choice Act (EFCA).306 Small measures, however, such as the election rules
recently adopted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which are
designed to increase the speed of elections, can make some difference if they
are passed in a way that will be upheld by the courts.307 State governments
303 Michael E. Murphy, The ESOP at Thirty: A Democratic Perspective, 41 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 655, 682 (2005) (noting lack of federal government-sponsored information services on
ESOPs). The Worker Ownership, Readiness, & Knowledge (WORK) Act, S. 3421, 112th
Cong. (2012), most recently introduced by Senator Bernard “Bernie” Sanders on July 23,
2012, which died in committee, has been introduced in the past three Congressional sessions.
It would establish a federal initiative within the Department of Labor (DOL) to encourage
worker ownership. The DOL would support state level centers, provide small grants to state
centers, hold an annual conference, and provide feasibility studies and technical assistance,
among other things. The National Cooperative Development Act, H.R. 3677, 112th Cong.
(2011), introduced by Representative Chaka Fattah on December 15, 2011 would designate a
national center to work with local centers to provide professional development to those
involved with cooperatives, to assist with legal documents necessary to establish a coopera-
tive, and to educate the community about cooperatives, among other things.
304 The Ohio Employee Ownership Center at Kent State University is an example of a
program that was previously funded by the state, although it is not currently so funded. See
About the OEOC, OHIO EMP. OWNERSHIP CENTER, http://www.oeockent.org/ (last visited
Mar. 23, 2014); Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a CED
Empowerment Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory
Decision-Making and Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 272 (2010)
(describing Fordham CED Clinic involvement in project forming worker-owned co-ops);
JOHN GRUMMEL & JOHN LOGUE, EMPLOYEES AND OWNERSHIP: TRENDS, CHARACTERISTICS,
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STATE EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP LEGISLATION (2000), available
at http://cog.kent.edu/lib/grummel.htm (surveying state employee ownership legislation).
305 Cf. Fran Ansley, Educating Workers About Labor Rights and Global Wrongs Through
Documentary Film, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 715, 719 (2008) (discussing how disen-
franchised often learn best from peers).
306 Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor
Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 390 (2007). See also Brett H. McDonnell,
Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429,
442 (2011) (discussing how supporting unions could aid employees role in corporate govern-
ance but is politically infeasible).
307 Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138 (Dec. 22, 2011) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–02); Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C.
2012) (holding voting process improper); Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Suspends Implemen-
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discouraging enactment of right-to-work laws would also continue the ability of
unions to gain funding and, thereby, organize in non-right to work states.308
Encouraging other agencies, such as local economic development agencies,309
centers for collaborative democracy within state universities,310 and workplace
centers could also lead to the availability of more institutions for cooptation,
given the current low rate of unionization.
To the extent that the law can encourage collective identity rather than
individualism, it might contribute to movements to found co-ops. The law is
largely a system of individually based rights, but some laws, such as the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), are based on protection of collective
rights, such as the right to act in concert to protest working conditions. The
NLRA does, however, limit the types of programs in which workers may par-
ticipate so as to avoid company unions.311 Some have proposed repealing Sec-
tion 8(a)(2), the section designed for such protection.312 Retaining current
board interpretation, which permits employee participation where employees
have ultimate authority,313 such as in worker co-ops, better encourages the col-
lective identity necessary for a successful co-op movement.314 The Board could
explicitly interpret Section 8(a)(2) as inapplicable to worker co-ops either
because there is no dealing between a separate labor organization and the co-
op, or because there is no employer domination, given that the employees
themselves own the company.315 A specific board ruling on this subject might
tation of Representation Case Amendments Based on Court Ruling (May 15, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-suspends-implementation-repre
sentation-case-amendments-based-court  (temporarily suspending election rules).
308 Indiana recently passed a “right to work” law. IND. CODE § 22-6-6 (2013).
309 GUNN, supra note 9, at 195 (discussing how economic development agencies should R
provide technical assistance and funds to self-managed firms).
310 The Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland is an example. DEMOCRACY
COLLABORATIVE, http://democracycollaborative.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
311 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990 (1992).
312 See Teamwork for Employees and Managers (“TEAM”) Act, H.R. 634, 105th Cong.
(1997).
313 See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 701 (2001) (holding committees did not
deal with management but instead exercised authority similar to a front-line supervisor); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993) (no unlawful “dealing with”
management if committee is governed by majority decision-making, management represent-
atives are in the minority, and committee has power to decide matters for itself). See also
Harper, supra note 9, at 9–10 (discussing 8(a)(2) principle of “independent employee repre-
sentative” preventing management manipulations).
314 Cf. Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Confrontations and Compromise: Dispute Resolution at a
Worker Cooperative Coal Mine, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 555, 592 (2001) (discussing how
worker cooperatives may foster greater resolution of problems while total quality manage-
ment programs may not because the invitations for employee involvement are seen as insin-
cere); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 7, at 828 (proposing safe harbor from Section 8(a)(2) if R
committee independent and representative).
315 Where a union is present, then even work councils within the co-op might not run afoul
of current § 8(a)(2), but where a union is not present, more detailed legal analysis is war-
ranted. If the employees are elected independent of the management and board and have
final binding authority, they too may not run afoul of current § 8(a)(2) because there is no
dealing when they have final say.
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be a useful tool for those in the social movements. Alternatively, the NLRA
could be amended to explicitly permit worker co-ops.316
Perhaps more significantly, these collective rights are not granted to super-
visors and managers.317 The Board has found employee-stockholders in pro-
ducer cooperatives excluded from the protection of the NLRA, at least where
they exercise management power.318 While many within the union movement
believe organizing outside the NLRA is more successful than within its stric-
tures, perhaps interpreting the limitation not to apply to employee-owners who
do not serve on boards or as managers would foster collective identity around
ownership in a way to be encouraged.319 Also, the rights to bargain collectively
over certain matters important to founding a co-op are limited.320 Easing the
ability of unions to lead a company buyout would help enable founding co-ops.
NLRB interpretations of the NLRA that limit unions’ ability to bargain over
financial matters and to obtain information about company finances could be
reinterpreted.321 While unlikely to gain political traction, a federal labor law to
holistically encourage co-ops might be drafted.322
Availability of resources is a significant component of a successful move-
ment. Law can encourage or provide different forms of resources. One aspect
of encouraging the ability to aggregate individual resources into collective ones
316 Note, Worker Ownership & Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 91
YALE L.J. 615, 617 (1982).
317 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (2012); NLRB v. Yeshiva
Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674 (1980).
318 Stone, supra note 34, at 123–24 (citing Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794 R
(1952)).
319 See Harper, supra note 9, at 58 (discussing how requiring loyalty from supervisors does
not apply to most employees in employee-controlled firms). See also Anamag, 284 N.L.R.B.
621, 624 (1987) (holding leaders of teams that engage in decision-making not supervisors);
Pioneer Holding Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 956, 957 (1960) (finding minority stock-holding owners
with no effective voice in management were employees included in unit but excluding owner
who served on board of directors); Stone, supra note 34, at 127 (describing Everett Plywood R
& Door Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 17 (1953) as holding that stockholder employees other than
those on the board of directors are not supervisors). Additional issues regarding conflicts of
interest between the union representative and the represented employees may arise under the
NLRA when the worker-coop is unionized if the union elects members to the board of direc-
tors. See Stone, supra note 34, at 129; Harper, supra note 9, at 63 (proposing disqualifying R
managers from union office).
320 See Pieper Elec., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1232 (2003) (particular stock option
purchase plan permissive subject of bargaining); N. Am. Pipe Corp., 347 N.L.R.B. 836, 840
(2006), rev. denied, 546 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2008) (particular stock offering permissive sub-
ject of bargaining); Harrah’s Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. 182, 187 (1992)
(holding that circulating petition advocating employee buy-out via ESOP not protected activ-
ity). See also Stone, supra note 34, at 95–96 (discussing how NLRB decisions sometimes R
limit bargaining over decisions involving capital investment or corporate transformation).
321 First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (excluding certain manage-
ment decisions from mandatory bargaining); Delmonte, supra note 115, at 16 (arguing that R
because managerial decisions are not mandatory terms, worker ownership was removed from
unions’ agenda).
322 If a union is involved in pressuring a company to succeed to an employee buy-out, rather
than sell to another customer, then potential Section 8(b)(1)(B) issues arise, but the Board
should interpret such pressure for a new form of ownership not to fall within its restrictions
on pressure to change managers. Hyde & Livingston, supra note 143, at 1189.
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by membership fees or sale of initial shares is the governing state law of incor-
poration.323 Laws that formally recognize a worker cooperative, known as
Massachusetts model laws, may facilitate the establishment of a worker co-
op.324 Several states have adopted the Massachusetts model which, in turn, is
based upon Mondrago´n.325 This model permits incorporation on a one share,
one vote basis, and permits a collective account and an individual account.326 A
certain percentage of net earnings is credited to the collective account, which is
used for capital improvements and to absorb loss.327 The remaining percentage
is credited to individual capital accounts, which are redeemed upon retirement,
death, or at the end of the employment relationship.328 Tax laws may also
encourage collectivizing individual resources, such as the EWOC tax deferral
provision, that might be added to or expanded in some way to encourage more
use.329 Perhaps a tax deduction similar to that for charitable giving could be
implemented either for the involved individuals or for the co-op, for the cost of
323 GUNN, supra note 9, at 197 (discussing simplifying process to incorporate and thereby R
cutting legal costs). Many states have laws of incorporation governing co-ops which are
more focused on agricultural or consumer co-ops and do not mention worker cooperatives.
David Ellerman, Workers’ Cooperatives: The Question of Legal Structure, in WORKER
COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 257, 258. Worker co-ops have been incorpo-
rated as corporations or LLC’s, in addition to under general co-op statutes. See id.; Solomon
& Kirgis, supra note 34, at 236 n.8 (noting every state has a cooperative corporation statute, R
but only a minority address worker co-ops).
324 Those in the co-op movement debate the best way to incorporate, and it is possible
different forms of incorporation are better for different co-ops.
325 States that had such laws as of 2005, in addition to Massachusetts, are Oregon, New
York, Washington, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont. Murphy, supra note 303, at 695
n.194. For more information on Mondrago´n, see Ana Gutie´rrez Johnson & William Foote
Whyte, The Mondrago´n System of Worker Production Cooperatives, in WORKPLACE
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 9, at 177.
326 See Murphy, supra note 303, at 696.
327 Id. at 695.
328 Id. A useful project would be to compile the laws of the fifty states governing worker
co-ops, including all those specific to worker co-ops, those for co-ops more generally, and
those for LLC’s. Some worker cooperatives also function as unincorporated associations of
independent contractors. See Cummings, supra note 9 (discussing how worker co-op can
increase job security).
329 I.R.C. § 1042 (2012); Blasi & Kruse, supra note 11, at 39 (noting underuse of EWOC R
tax deferral provision); Eric D. Britton & Mark C. Stewart, Selling Stock to Employees
Through a Qualified Worker-Owned Cooperative and Sheltering Capital Gain: The IRC
§ 1042 Rollover, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK, LLP, http://www.slk-law.com/portalre
source/lookup/wosid/cp-base-4-5708/media.name/MCS.SLK_TOL-_698879-v1-F__HOME
_CDEMSKI_MCS_Employee_Cooperative_Journal_Article_doc[1].pdf (last visited Mar.
23, 2014) (explaining how to take advantage of the tax break); Phillips, supra note 1, at 37
(explaining the requirements to take advantage of the tax break, including 30 percent owner-
ship by employees in the first year of the sale); Promotion and Expansion of Private
Employee Ownership Act, S. 742, 113th Cong. (2013), introduced by Senator Benjamin
Cardin on April 16, 2013, would extend the tax break to apply not only to C Corporations
but also to S Corporations. See also A. 3626, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2013), available at http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/A4000/3626_E1.pdf (which would provide a state tax ben-
efit for a sale to a worker co-op similar to the current federal benefit).
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volunteer labor time to build or renovate a plant being turned into a worker co-
op.330
The law might also enable those who wish to found a co-op to make use of
value added resources. Forms of incorporation that encourage expected added
value to be used as resources might aid founding cooperatives. Newer forms of
incorporation, such as the LLC331 or the limited liability cooperative associa-
tion, are being implemented in some states. These forms permit non-voting
outside investors. Perhaps laws specific to worker co-ops that are structured in
a manner parallel to the ways in which these laws are being used would
encourage value added resources.332 To the extent that SEC regulations or sim-
ilar state regulations are implicated,333 they might be interpreted or revised to
exempt certain worker cooperatives.334 Tax laws can also encourage value
added resources by permitting patronage to be taxed only once, and these laws
might be added to or expanded upon to provide benefits to co-ops.335 Encour-
aging government agencies that make loans, such as the US Small Business
Administration,336 to recognize the value added potential of co-ops and provide
loans would help create added value resources. Funding agencies devoted to
making such loans on a state level, such as the National Co-op Bank on the
federal level would also help.337 Legal support for credit unions, which may be
more likely to loan to co-ops, can also increase value added resources.338 State
and federal agencies might give bidding priority to co-ops in a manner similar
to the priority currently given to unionized and minority owned companies.339
330 See I.R.C. § 170 (2012) (treating charitable contributions as deductible from income
tax); see also I.R.C. § 2522 (2012) (exempting charitable contributions from gift tax); I.R.C.
§ 2055 (2012) (exempting charitable contributions from value of taxable estate).
331 See McDonnell, supra note 306, at 437 (mentioning that the LCC might be more flexi-
ble than the corporate form). See also Cummings, supra note 9, at 205–09 (discussing using
LLC to establish worker co-op but stating it may be more difficult to raise capital).
332 Cf. Huertas-Noble, supra note 304, at 273 (use of two LLCs to found restaurant co-op).
333 See Solomon & Kirgis, supra note 34, at 253 (discussing how SEC has viewed some R
cooperative plans as securities) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(1988)).
334 See id. at 254 (discussing use of private placement exemption).
335 Murphy, supra note 303, at 698. “Commercial lenders may exclude from taxable income
50 percent of interest income on loans made to ESOPs.” Hyde & Livingston, supra note 143,
at 1142.
336 See Murphy, supra note 303, at 687 (discussing SBA loan guarantee program and noting
assistance available for employee buyouts through Job Training Partnership Act and
Workforce Investment Act of 1998); Solomon & Kirgis, supra note 34, at 256; Melissa R
Hoover & Beadsie Woo, To Jumpstart US Job Market, Turn Workers into Owners, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010
/0111/To-jumpstart-US-job-market-turn-workers-into-owners.
337 Only North Dakota has such a state-owned bank. See Christopher Matthews, Are State-
Owned Banks the Antidote to the Too-Big-To-Fail Epidemic?, TIME (Jan. 15, 2013), http://
business.time.com/2013/01/15/are-state-owned-banks-the-antidote-to-the-too-big-to-fail-epi
demic/. See also United States Employee Ownership Bank Act, S. 3419, 112th Cong. (2012)
(introduced by Senator Bernard “Bernie” Sanders on July 23, 2012 but died in committee). It
would establish a federal bank to provide loans to majority employee-owned companies.
338 See GUNN, supra note 9, at 195–96 (discussing expanding availability of debt financ- R
ing); Solomon & Kirgis, supra note 34, at 256 (mentioning ICA Revolving Loan Fund, The R
Self-Help Credit Union, and the NCB Development Corporation).
339 Cf. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 1794 (mentioning that France and Italy grant construc- R
tion co-ops special advantages in bidding for government business).
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Law might also enable appropriation of existing collective resources. One
potentially significant resource is pension funds which, while in some sense
collective, are still ultimately owed to individuals. While stringent protections
for such funds must be in place to assure their availability for retirement, per-
haps ERISA could be reformed. ERISA reform could make the process to
establishing a democratic ESOP easier. Additionally, ERISA reform might pro-
vide an exemption from the rule requiring that no more than 10 percent of an
employee benefit plan’s funds be held in company stock, similar to the exemp-
tion currently provided for ESOPs, to non-ESOP worker co-ops when strike
funds or wage and benefit concessions, rather than pension funds, make up a
large portion of the funds used to form the co-op.340 Also, state and local gov-
ernments might provide tax breaks to co-ops that create jobs, similar to tax
incentives available to large employers who move into an area.341
Additionally, law might encourage patrons for co-ops. Certainly, the avail-
ability of a government grant program for feasibility studies or start-up funds
would increase the number of potential resources.342 Government initiatives to
find private patrons for co-ops in certain industries or geographic areas would
also be encouraging. Perhaps a law targeting web-based crowdfunding by co-
ops could be helpful.343 Additionally, laws encouraging estate planning trusts
340 See Delmonte, supra note 115, at 17 (discussing how DOL must grant prohibited trans- R
action exemption when employees buy more than 10 percent of the worth of a plan in com-
pany stock and hold it in a non-ESOP trust); 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2012) (“A plan may
not acquire any qualifying employer security or qualifying employer real property, if imme-
diately after such acquisition the aggregate fair market value of employer securities and
employer real property held by the plan exceeds 10 percent of the fair market value of the
assets of the plan.”). See also id. § 1107(b) (exempting ESOP from 10 percent prohibition).
341 Hoover & Woo, supra note 336. See also Bebe Raupe, State Tax Incentives Will Permit
Toyota to Expand Kentucky Plant, Create 750 Jobs, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Apr. 19, 2013
(discussing Kentucky Economic Development and Finance Authority’s Approval of $146.5
million state tax incentive package for Toyota to retain 6,169 jobs and create 750 new jobs);
Steven M. Virgil, Community Economic Development and Rural America: Strategies for
Community-Based Collaborative Development, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 9, 20 (2010) (discussing use of state tax incentive programs to foster community
development in rural areas); Business Tax Credits, TENN. DEP’T ECON. & COMMUNITY DEV.,
http://www.tn.gov/ecd/BD_business_tax_credit.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (minimum
waivable job requirement of twenty-five net new jobs).
342 Solomon & Kirgis, supra note 34, at 256 (mentioning special assistance grants available R
through US Economic Development Administration); see also FRANK T. ADAMS & GARY B.
HANSEN, PUTTING DEMOCRACY TO WORK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR STARTING AND MANAG-
ING WORKER-OWNED BUSINESSES 7 (rev. ed. 1992) (describing Department of Cooperatives
in province of Quebec in 1980’s which helped with feasibility studies, financial projections,
and aid requests).
343 Crowd-funding might take the form of donations or loans. Some securities regulations
might be implicated in certain situations. See DAVID SMATHERS MOORE, TEAMWORKS
COOPS., THOUGHTS ON BUILDING THE WORKER COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT’S CAPACITY IN
THE US 2 (2012), available at http://teamworks.coop/pdf/some_thoughts_on_building_US
_movement.pdf (discussing possibility of using crowd-funding for US cooperatives through
the provisions of the JOBS Act); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306 (2012). Ian Marder, a masters student at University of Leeds, first suggested
this idea to the author in response to a presentation of an early draft. He also suggested the
use of local currency to funnel local funds toward co-ops. Local currency is in use in various
areas in the United States, although certain states prohibit paying employees in any currency
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 42 24-APR-14 14:44
Spring 2014] FOUNDING WORKER COOPERATIVES 363
or other trusts set up to fund worker co-ops, similar to charitable trusts, might
be enacted.344 Some have suggested a law providing for funding of urban co-
ops similar to the support system currently in place for agricultural co-ops.345
V. CONCLUSION
Legal scholars, economists, and others have sought to explain the absence
of large numbers of worker co-ops in the United States, illustrating the various
types of barriers to successfully founding a worker co-op. In other contexts,
legal scholars have relied on social movement theory to explain how groups
can overcome barriers to organization. This paper details several historical
examples of successful movements to establish worker co-ops. It then relies on
the application of social movement theory to these co-ops to explain how
groups might overcome barriers to organization of a co-op. The application
suggests further areas of inquiry with regard to social movement theories.
Applying social movement theory to the movements toward founding co-ops
also offers insights as to how unions, economic developers, and the law might
contribute to the success of movements aimed at founding cooperatives. Some
of these insights are novel, such as providing a tax deduction for time volun-
teered to build or renovate a co-op facility, developing limited liability coopera-
tive association acts specifically for worker co-ops, providing bidding priority
for co-ops, or encouraging crowd-funding by co-ops. While, at most times, suc-
cessful foundation of a worker co-op is unlikely, social movement theory
speaks to how the widespread belief in worker participation346 might be acti-
vated into a movement to start a co-op.
other than the US dollar. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 85 (1996).
344 GUNN, supra note 9, at 197 (discussing use of trusts by those willing to change private to R
public property or property for collective use).
345 Hoover & Woo, supra note 336; see also BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS ¶ 104.2, at 2 (2013) (mentioning that
farmers’ cooperatives are entitled to special deductions).
346 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 4 (Cornell Paperbacks
updated ed. 2006) (1999) (finding workers want more participation at the workplace); Paul
C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 197–99 (2001) (discussing how many employees desire more participa-
tion in workplace decisions).
